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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

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fact that the news media obtained information (which could just as probably come from recipients of the subpoenas), no conclusion can be drawn that the Committee released the information. The complaint alleged no specific fact showing that the release was by a named Committee member or by an authorized employee at a stated time and place or by some stated means. Unsupported conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish something as a fact. *Riley v. Titus*, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 79, 190 F. 2d 653 (1951).

**V. Plaintiffs' Conclusory Allegations Set Forth in the Complaint and in Their Affidavits Should Be Stricken as a Matter of Law**

From what we have shown *supra*, it is clear that the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings scheduled for August 16, 1966, which are challenged in this proceeding, serve a legitimate legislative purpose. The conclusory allegations set forth in plaintiffs' affidavits and in paragraphs 10, 12 and 13 of their complaint purport to contravene the fact that the hearings serve a valid purpose. However, even the most cursory examination of the enumerated paragraphs of the complaint and the affidavits will reflect the broad and all-encompassing sweep of plaintiffs' contentions and logically, will demonstrate, as well, that their assertions can be predicated only upon conjecture and emotion and not upon personal knowledge as they represent in their verification to the complaint and in their affidavits.

Absent basic, factual allegations which would of necessity be exposed to the fresh air of examination by this Court, plaintiffs' conclusory assertions are insufficient as a matter of law to sustain their contentions that purposes, other than legitimate legislative inquiry, exist for the hearings now being conducted.

The rule controlling here arose out of *Riley v. Titus*, *supra*, where our Court of Appeals stated at pp. 654-55: "The appellant bases her suit for recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act upon alleged misconduct of her superior officers prior to her discharge. For the most part, however, her complaint describes their action in only such general and conclusory terms as 'arbitrary' and 'unlawful.' No factual allegations emerge from her voluminous pleadings and affidavits with sufficient clarity to show a basis for recovery on a theory of tort liability. At the most there are only remote references to a 'conspiracy' and 'threats' by two persons who were her superiors at different times in different states. In a parallel situation, this court has stated, 'Though it [the complaint] characterizes appellees' alleged conduct as wrongful, unlawful, and malicious, it does not sufficiently disclose the conduct to enable a court to judge whether or not it was tortious.' *Burns v. Spiller*, 1947, 82 U.S. App. D.C. 91, 161 F. 2d 377, certiorari denied, 1947 332 U.S. 792, 68 S. Ct. 101, 92 L. Ed. 373. See Rule 8(a), Fed. R. CivP. In that case the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted there appearing no issue as to any material fact, the granting of summary judgment was proper in regard to this aspect of appellant's case for the same reason."

Similarly, in *Chung Wing Ping v. Kennedy*, 111 U.S. App. D.C. 106, 294 F. 2d 735 (1961) the Court concluded that an unsupported and nebulous allegation of criminal conspiracy was not a sufficient basis for allowing discovery to contest a motion for summary judgment. Because of supervening public policy need to free federal officers acting in accord with their responsibilities from vexatious suits the courts have made a like application of the rule to them and held that the "official immunity" doctrine is not affected by inclusion in the com-

plaint of allegations of "malice", "conspiracy", "unlawfulness" and the like. See e.g., *Barr v. Matteo*, 360 U.S. 565, 569 (malice); *Norton v. McShane*, *supra*, 332 F. 2d at 357 (malicious arrest, abuse and mistreatment, and conspiracy); *Gager v. "Bob Seidel"*, 112 U.S. App. D.C. 135, 140, 300 F. 2d 727, 732, cert. denied 370 U.S. 959 (1962) (conspiracy); *Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete*, 299 F. 2d 655, 657-659 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963) (willfully, maliciously, with intent to harm and injure); *Bershad v. Wood*, *supra*, 290 F. 2d at 715-719 (malice); *DeBusk v. Harvin*, 212 F. 2d 143, 147 (5th Cir. 1954) (malicious acts and conspiracy); *Gregoire v. Biddle*, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 949 (1950) (conspired and maliciously and willfully entered into a scheme); *Laughlin v. Rosenman*, 82 U.S. App. D.C. 164, 166, 163 F. 2d 838, 840 (1947) (knowingly, wilfully and maliciously participated in an unlawful conspiracy); *Cooper v. O'Connor*, 69 U.S. App. D.C. 100, 102, 99 F. 2d 135, 137, cert. denied 305 U.S. 643 (1938) (wanton, malicious and unlawful acts).

For this reason plaintiff's unsupported conclusory allegations both in the complaint and in their affidavits should be stricken.

Wherefore, for the reasons stated herein the Court is respectfully urged to strike paragraphs 10, 12 and 13 of the complaint and paragraphs 4 and 5 of each of the plaintiffs' affidavits and to dismiss the complaint.

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### VIETNAM—A MIDDLE WAY

(Mr. RYAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, like the fluctuations of war itself, there is an ebb and a flow to the words and terms of the debates which accompany the decisions surrounding a war. The military, political, and rhetorical involvement of the United States in the war in Vietnam is less like an escalator smoothly carrying us from one level to another, than it is like a car caught in a traffic jam, sometimes at rest, sometimes creeping along slowly, but always trying to go as fast as it can without crashing into the cars in front of it.

During the past weekend the debate suddenly put on a spurt of energy. There was fresh evidence that the United States is prepared to get far more involved in the war than most Americans had dreamed possible. Former President Eisenhower announced to the 190 million Americans who have not read his memoirs that the country was perfectly prepared to use nuclear weapons in Korea when our adversaries decided to call it quits. And the ranking Thai military officer announced that the United States is already at war in northeastern Thailand.

But those who urged restraint were no less vocal. Former White House Aid Richard Goodwin suggested the formation of a committee to oppose the escalation of the war in Vietnam.

In addition, the Sunday edition of the New York Times magazine section carried a devastating analysis of the war by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., former assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who concludes that—

Deescalation could work, if there were the will to pursue it.

Perhaps Goodwin and Schlesinger will only convert those of us who are already convinced that the United States should follow this course. But I cannot believe that their comments would not influence the thinking of the "hawks" as well, if only they were willing to listen.

In the firm hope that Professor Schlesinger's comments will not fall on deaf ears, I am inserting his article, "A Middle Way Out of Vietnam," in the RECORD at this point. I hope that it will be widely read.

The article follows:

SCHLESINGER SUGGESTS THAT WE RECOVER OUR COOL AND FOLLOW A MIDDLE WAY OUT OF VIETNAM

(By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.)

(NOTE.—Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., is a former special assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, author of "A Thousand Days," and Albert Schweitzer professor of the humanities, City University of New York.)

Why we are in Vietnam is today a question of only historical interest. We are there, for better or for worse, and we must deal with the situation that exists. Our national security may not have compelled us to draw a line across Southeast Asia where we did, but, having drawn it, we cannot lightly abandon it. Our stake in South Vietnam may have been self-created, but it has nonetheless become real. Our precipitate withdrawal now would have ominous reverberations throughout Asia. Our commitment of over 300,000 American troops, young men of exceptional skill and gallantry engaged in cruel and difficult warfare, measures the magnitude of our national concern.

We have achieved this entanglement, not after due and deliberate consideration, but through a series of small decisions. It is not only idle but unfair to seek out guilty men. President Eisenhower, after rejecting American military intervention in 1954, set in motion the policy of support for Saigon which resulted, two Presidents later, in American military intervention in 1965. Each step in the deepening of the American commitment was reasonably regarded at the time as the last that would be necessary; yet, in retrospect, each step led only to the next, until we find ourselves entrapped today in that nightmare of American strategists, a land war in Asia—a war which no President, including President Johnson, desired or intended. The Vietnam story is a tragedy without villains. No thoughtful American can withhold sympathy as President Johnson ponders the gloomy choices which lie ahead.

Yet each President, as he makes his choices, must expect to be accountable for them. Everything in recent weeks—the actions of the Administration, the intimations of actions to come, even a certain harshness in the Presidential rhetoric—suggests that President Johnson has made his choice, and that his choice is the careful enlargement of the war. New experiments in escalation are first denied, then disowned, then discounted and finally undertaken. As past medicine fails, all we can apparently think to do is to increase the dose. In May the Secretary of the Air Force explained why we were not going to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong; at the end of June we began the strikes against the oil depots.

The demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam has been used by North Vietnam units for years, but suddenly we have begun to bomb it.

When such steps work no miracles—and it is safe to predict that escalation will be no more decisive in the future than it has been in the past—the demand will arise for “just one more step.” Plenty of room remains for widening the war: the harbors of North Vietnam, the irrigation dikes, the steel plants, the factories, the power grid, the crops, the civilian population, the Chinese border. The fact that we excluded such steps yesterday is, alas, no guarantee that we will not pursue them tomorrow. And if bombing will not bring Ho Chi Minh to his knees or stop his support of the Vietcong in South Vietnam, there is always the last resort of invasion. General Ky has already told us that we must invade North Vietnam to win the war. In his recent press conference, the Secretary of State twice declined to rule out this possibility.

The theory, of course, is that widening the war will shorten it. This theory appears to be based on three convictions: first, that the war will be decided in North Vietnam; second, that the risk of Chinese or Soviet entry is negligible, and third, that military “victory” in some sense is possible. Perhaps these premises are correct, and in another year or two we may all be saluting the wisdom and statesmanship of the American Government. In so inscrutable a situation, no one can be confident about his doubt and disagreement. Nonetheless, to many Americans these propositions constitute a terribly shaky basis for action which has already carried the United States into a ground war in Asia and which may well carry the world to the brink of the third world war.

The illusion that the war in South Vietnam can be decided in North Vietnam is evidently a result of listening too long to our own propaganda. Our Government has insisted so often that the war in Vietnam is a clear-cut case of aggression across frontiers that it has come to believe itself that the war was started in Hanoi and can be stopped there. “The war,” the Secretary of State has solemnly assured us, “is clearly an ‘armed attack,’ cynically and systematically mounted by the Hanoi regime against the people of South Vietnam.”

Yet the best evidence is that the war began as an insurrection within South Vietnam which, as it has gathered momentum, has attracted increasing support and direction from the north. Even today the North Vietnamese regulars in South Vietnam amount to only a fraction of the total enemy force (and to an even smaller fraction of the American army in South Vietnam). We could follow the genial prescription of General LeMay and bomb North Vietnam back to the Stone Age—and the war would still go on in South Vietnam. To reduce this war to the simplification of a wicked regime molesting its neighbors, and to suppose that it can be ended by punishing the wicked regime, is purely to misconceive not only the political but even the military character of the problem.

As for the assurances that China will not enter, these will be less than totally satisfying to those whose memory stretches back to the Korean War. General MacArthur, another one of those military experts on Oriental psychology, when asked by President Truman on Wake Island in October, 1950, what the chances were of Chinese intervention, replied, “Very little. . . . Now that we have our bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter.” Such reasoning lay behind the decision (the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at that time is Secretary of State today) to send American troops across the

38th Parallel despite warnings from Peking that this would provoke a Chinese response. In a few weeks, China was actively in the war, and, while there was the greatest slaughter, it was not notably of the Chinese.

There seems little question that the Chinese have no great passion to enter the war in Vietnam. They do not want to put their nuclear plants in hazard; and, in any case, their foreign policy has typically been a compound of polemical ferocity and practical prudence. But the leaders in Peking are no doubt just as devoted students of Munich as the American Secretary of State. They are sure that we are out to bury them; they believe that appeasement invites further aggression; and, however deep their reluctance, at some point concern for national survival will make them fight.

When will that point be reached? Probably when they are confronted by a direct threat to their frontier, either through bombing or through an American decision to cross the 17th Parallel and invade North Vietnam. If a Communist regime barely established in Peking could take a decision to intervene against the only atomic power in the world in 1950, why does anyone suppose that a that decision in 1966? Indeed, given the much stronger regime should flinch from present discord in Peking, war may seem the best way to renew revolutionary discipline, stop the brawling and unite the nation.

It is true that the Chinese entry into the Korean War had at least the passive support of the Soviet Union; but it would be risky today to rely on the Sino-Soviet split to save us from everything, including Soviet aid to China in case of war with the United States or even direct Soviet entry into the war in Vietnam. For the Soviet Union is already extensively involved in Vietnam—more so in a sense than the Chinese—and it would be foolish to suppose that, given Moscow's competition with Peking for the leadership of the Communist world, Russia could afford to stand by and allow Communist North Vietnam or Communist China to be destroyed by the American imperialists.

As for the third premise (that military “victory” is in some sense possible): The Joint Chiefs of Staff of course, by definition argue for military solutions. They are the most fervent apostles of “one more step.” That is their business, and no one should be surprised that generals behave like generals. The fault lies not with those who give this advice but those who take it. Once, early in the Kennedy Administration, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs outlined the processes of escalation in Southeast Asia before the National Security Council, concluding, “If we are given the right to use nuclear weapons, we can guarantee victory.” President Kennedy sat glumly rubbing an upper molar. After a moment someone said, “Mr. President, perhaps you would have the general explain to us what he means by victory.” Kennedy grunted and dismissed the meeting. Later he said, “Since he couldn't think of any further escalation, he would have to promise us victory.”

What is the purpose of bombing the north? It is hard to find out. According to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, “The objective of our air campaign is to change the will of the enemy leadership.” Secretary McNamara, on the other hand, has said, “We never believed that bombing would destroy North Vietnam's will.” Whatever the theory, the results would appear to support Secretary McNamara. The northern strategy, instead of driving Hanoi to the conference table, seems to have hardened the will of the regime, convinced it that its life is at stake, brought it closer to China and solidified the people of North Vietnam in its support.

“There is no indication,” General Westmoreland said the other day, “that the resolve of the leadership in Hanoi has been reduced.” In other words, bombing has had

precisely the effect that the analyses of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey after the Second World War would have forecast. Under Secretary of State George Ball was a director of that survey; this may well be why he has been reported so unenthusiastic about the air assault on the North.

And, far from stopping infiltration across the 17th Parallel, bombing, if our own statistics are to be believed, has stimulated it. “It is perfectly clear,” Secretary McNamara has said, “that the North Vietnamese have continued to increase their support of the Vietcong despite the increase in our effort. . . . What has happened is that the North Vietnamese have continually increased the amount of resources, men and material that they have been willing to devote to their objective.”

Nor can we easily match this infiltration by enlarging our own forces—from 300,000, for example, to 500,000 or 750,000. The ratio of superiority preferred by the Pentagon in guerrilla war is 10 to 1, which means that every time we send in 100,000 more men the enemy has only to send in 10,000 or so, and we are all even again. Reinforcement has not created a margin of American superiority; all it has done is to lift the stalemate to a higher and more explosive level. Indeed, there is reason to suppose that, in its own manner, the enemy can match our every step of escalation up to the point of nuclear war.

U.S. News & World Report says in its issue of Aug. 22: “It's clear now to military men: bombing will not win in Vietnam.” This is a dispiriting item. Why had our military leaders not long ago freed themselves from the illusion of the omnipotence of air power, so cherished by civilians who think wars can be won on the cheap? The Korean war, as Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway has said, “taught that it is impossible to interdict the supply route of an Asian army by airpower alone. We had complete air mastery over North Korea, and we clobbered Chinese supply columns unmercifully. . . . But we did not halt their offensive nor materially diminish its strength.” If air power was not decisive in Korea, where the warfare was conventional and the terrain relatively open and compact, how could anyone suppose that it would be decisive against guerrillas threading their way through the hills and jungles of Vietnam?

The bombing illusion applies, of course, to South as well as to North Vietnam. Tactical bombing—bombing in direct support of ground operations—has its place; but the notion that strategic bombing can stop guerrillas runs contrary to experience. And we had it last winter, on the authority of the Secretary of State, that despite the entry of North Vietnamese regulars the war in South Vietnam “continues to be basically a guerrilla operation.”

Sir Robert Thompson, who planned the successful British effort against the Malayan guerrillas and later served as head of the British advisory mission in Saigon, has emphasized that the defending force must operate “in the same element” as their adversaries. Counterinsurgency, he writes, “is like trying to deal with a tomcat in an alley. It is no good inserting a large, fierce dog. The dog may not find the tomcat; if he does, the tomcat will escape up a tree; and the dog will then chase the female cats. The answer is to put in a fiercer tomcat.”

Alas, we have no fiercer tomcat. The counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam has languished, while our bombers roam over that hapless country, dumping more tonnage of explosives each month than we were dropping per month on all Europe and Africa during the Second World War. Just the other day our bombs killed or injured more than 100 civilians in a hamlet in the Mekong Delta—all on the suspicion that two Vietcong platoons numbering perhaps 60 men, were there. Even if the Vietcong had still been



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around, which they weren't would the military gain have outweighed the human and political loss? Charles Mohr writes in *The Times*: "Almost every provincial hospital in Vietnam is crowded with civilian victims of the war. Some American doctors and other officials in the field say the majority are the victims of American air power and South Vietnamese artillery."

The trouble is that we are fighting one war, with our B-52's and our naval guns and our napalm, and the Vietcong are fighting another, with their machine guns and ambushes and forays in the dark. "If we can get the Vietcong to stand up and fight, we will blast him," General Westmoreland has plaintively said; and when they occasionally rise to the surface and try to fight our kind of war, we do blast them. But the fact that they then slide back into the shadows does not mean that we are on the verge of some final military triumph. It means simply that we are driving them underground—where they renew themselves and where our large, fierce dog cannot follow.

Salon officials have been reporting that Vietcong morale is declining as long as I can remember; these reports need not be taken seriously now. I know of no convincing evidence that the Vietcong lack the political and emotional commitment to keep fighting underground for another 20 years.

Our strategy in Vietnam is rather like trying to weed a garden with a bulldozer. We occasionally dig up some weeds, but we dig up most of the turf, too. The effect of our policy is to pulverize the political and institutional fabric which alone can give a South Vietnamese state that hope of independent survival which is our presumed war aim. Our method, in other words, defeats our goal. Indeed, the most likely beneficiary of the smashed social structure of South Vietnam will be Communism. "My feeling," Gen. Wallace Greene, commandant of the Marine Corps, has wisely said, "is that you could kill every Vietcong and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam and still lose the war. Unless we can make a success of the civic-action program, we are not going to obtain the objectives we have set."

Much devotion and intelligence are at present going into the programs of reconstruction, but prospects are precarious so long as the enemy can slice through so much of South Vietnam with such apparent immunity; and so long as genuine programs of social reform threaten the vested interests of the Saigon Government and of large landholders. In any case, as claimants on our resources, these programs of pacification are hopelessly outclassed by the programs of destruction. Surely, the United States, with all its ingenuity, could have figured out a better way to combat guerrilla warfare than the physical obliteration of the nation in which it is taking place. If this is our best idea of "protecting" a country against "wars of national liberation," what other country, seeing the devastation we have wrought in Vietnam, will wish American protection?

At the same time, our concentration on Vietnam is exacting a frightful cost in other areas of national concern. In domestic policy, with Vietnam gulping down a billion and a half dollars a month, everything is grinding to a stop. Lyndon Johnson was on his way to a place in history as a great President for his vision of a Great Society; but the Great Society is now, except for token gestures, dead. The fight for equal opportunity for the Negro, the war against poverty, the struggle to save the cities, the improvement of our schools—all must be starved for the sake of Vietnam. And war brings ugly side-effects: inflation; frustration; angry protest; attack on dissenters on the ground that they cheer the enemy (an attack often mounted by men who led the

dissent during the Korean war); premonitions of McCarthyism.

We also pay a cost abroad. Our allies naturally draw away as they see us heading down the road toward war with China. When we began to bomb the oil depots, James Reston wrote: "There is now not a single major nation in the world that supports Mr. Johnson's latest adventure in Hanoi and Halphong." As nations seek to disengage themselves from the impending conflict, the quasi-neutrality of leaders like de Gaulle gains new plausibility.

On any realistic assessment, Western Europe and Latin America are far more significant to American security than South Asia; yet the Vietnam obsession has stultified our policy and weakened our position in both these vital areas. The war has clouded the hope, once mildly promising, of progress toward a *détente* with the Soviet Union. It has helped block agreements to end underground nuclear testing and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. It has precipitated the decision of U Thant to resign as Secretary General of the United Nations and condemns the U.N. itself to a time of declining influence.

Our rejection of the views of our friends and allies—our conviction, as Paul H. Smith has put it, "that we alone are qualified to be judge, jury and executioner"—ignores Madison's solemn warning in the 63rd Federalist: "An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the one is that independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind."

The Administration has called the critics of its Vietnam policy "neoisolationists." But surely the real neoisolationists are those who have isolated the United States from its allies and raised the tattered standard, last flourished 15 years ago by Douglas MacArthur, of "going it alone."

How have we managed to imprison ourselves in this series of dilemmas? One reason surely is that we have somehow lost our understanding of the uses of power. Understanding of power implies above all precision in its application. We have moved away from the subtle strategy of "flexible response" under which the level of American force was graduated to meet the level of enemy threat. The triumph of this discriminate employment of power was, of course, the Cuban missile crisis (where the Joint Chiefs, as usual, urged an air assault on the missile bases). But President Johnson, for all his formidable abilities, has shown no knack for discrimination in his use of power. His technique is to try and overwhelm his adversary—as in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam—by piling on all forms of power without regard to the nature of the threat.

Given this weakness for the indiscriminate use of power, it is easy to see why the application of force in Vietnam has been surrendered to the workings of what an acute observer of the Johnson foreign policy, Philip Geyelin, calls "the escalation machine." This machine is, in effect, the momentum in the decision-making system which keeps enlarging the war "for reasons only marginally related to military need."

The very size and weight of the American military presence generate unceasing pressures to satisfy military demands. These may be demands to try out new weapons; the London Sunday Telegraph recently ran an informative article comparing the Vietnam war to the Spanish Civil War as a military testing ground and laboratory. Or they may be cries for "one more step," springing in part from suppressed rage over the fact that, with military power sufficient to blow up the world, we still cannot compel guerrilla bands in black pajamas to submit to our will. Whatever the reason, Sir Robert Thompson has noted of the American theory of the war: "There was a constant tendency in Vietnam to mount large-scale operations, which had little purpose or prospect of success, merely to indicate that something aggressive was being done."

The Administration has freely admitted that such operations, like the bombing of the North, are designed in part to prop up the morale of the Saigon Government. And the impression is growing now that they are also in part undertaken in order to smother doubts about the war in the United States and to reverse anti-Administration tendencies in the polls. Americans have become curiously insensitive to the use of military operations for domestic political purposes. A quarter-century ago President Roosevelt postponed the North African invasion so that it would not take place before the midterm elections of 1942; but today observers in Washington, without evidence of shock, predict a new venture in escalation before the midterm elections of 1966.

The triumph of the escalation machine has been assisted by the faultiness of the information on which our decisions are based. Nothing is phonier than the spurious exactitude of our statistics about the Vietnam war. No doubt a computerized military establishment demands numbers; but the "body count" of dead Vietcong, for example, includes heaven knows how many innocent bystanders and could hardly be more unreliable. The figures on enemy strength are totally baffling, at least to the ordinary citizen relying on the daily newspaper. The *Times* on Aug. 10 described "the latest intelligence reports" in Saigon as saying that the number of enemy troops in South Vietnam had increased 52,000 since Jan. 1 to a total of 282,000. Yet, "according to official figures," the enemy had suffered 31,571 killed in action in this period, and the infiltration estimate ranged from 35,000 as "definite" to 54,000 as "possible."

The only way to reconcile these figures is to conclude that the Vietcong have picked up from 36,000 to 50,000 local recruits in this period. Since this seems unlikely—especially in view of our confidence in the decline of Vietcong morale—a safer guess is to question the wonderful precision of the statistics. Even the rather vital problem of how many North Vietnamese troops are in South Vietnam is swathed in mystery. The *Times* reported on Aug. 7: "About 40,000 North Vietnamese troops are believed by allied intelligence to be in the South." According to an Associated Press dispatch from Saigon printed in *The Christian Science Monitor* of Aug. 15: "The South Vietnamese Government says 102,500 North Vietnamese combat troops and support battalions have infiltrated into South Vietnam."

"These figures are far in excess of United States intelligence estimates, which put the maximum number of North Vietnamese in the South at about 54,000."

But General Westmoreland told his Texas press conference on Aug. 14 that the enemy force included "about 110,000 main-force North Vietnamese regular army troops." Perhaps these statements are all reconcilable, but an apparent discrepancy of this

magnitude on a question of such importance raises a twinge of doubt.

Nor is our ignorance confined to battle-order statistics. We have always lacked genuine knowledge of and insight into the political and cultural problems of Vietnam, and the more we press all problems into a military framework the worse off we are. The Administration in Washington was systematically misinformed by senior American officials in Saigon in 1962-63 regarding the progress of the war, the popularity of Diem, the effectiveness of the "strategic hamlet" program and other vital matters. It was not that these officials were deliberately deceiving their President; it was that they had deceived themselves first. Ordinary citizens restricted to reading the American press were better informed in 1963 than officials who took top-secret cables seriously.

The fact is that our Government just doesn't know a lot of things it pretends to know. It is not discreditable that it should not know them, for the facts are elusive and the judgments incredibly difficult. But it is surely inexcusable that it should pretend to know things it does not—and that it should pass its own ignorance on to the American people as certitude. And it is even less excusable that it should commit the nation to a policy involving the greatest dangers on a foundation so vague and precarious.

So now we are set on the course of widening the war—even at the cost of multiplying American casualties in Vietnam and deepening American troubles at home and abroad; even at the risk of miring our nation in a hopeless and endless conflict on the mainland of Asia beyond the effective employment of our national power and beyond the range of our primary interests; even at the risk of nuclear war.

Why does the Administration feel that these costs must be paid and these risks run? Hovering behind our policy is a larger idea—the idea that the war in Vietnam is not just a local conflict between Vietnamese but a fateful test of wills between China and the United States.

Our political and rhetorical escalation of the war has been almost as perilous as our military escalation. President Kennedy's effort was to pull Laos out of the context of great-power conflict and reduce the Laotian civil war to rational proportions. As he told Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961, Laos was just not important enough to entangle two great nations. President Johnson, on the other hand, has systematically inflated the significance of the war in Vietnam. "We have tried to make it clear over and over again," as the Secretary of State has put it, "that although Hanoi is the prime actor in this situation, that it is the policy of Peking that has greatly stimulated Hanoi. . . . It is Ho Chi Minh's war. Maybe it is Mao Tse-tung's war."

"In the forties and fifties," President Johnson has said, "we took our stand in Europe to protect the freedom of those threatened by aggression. Now the center of attention has shifted to another part of the world where aggression is on the march. Our stand must be as firm as ever." Given this view, it is presumably necessary to pay the greatest costs and run the greatest risks—or else invite the greatest defeat.

Given this view, too, there is no reason not to Americanize the war. President Kennedy did not believe that the war in Vietnam could succeed as a war of white men against Asians. It could not be won, he said a few weeks before his death, "unless the people [of South Vietnam] support the effort. . . . We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam." We have now junked this doctrine. Instead, we have enlarged our military presence until it is the only thing that matters in South Vietnam, and we plan now

to make it still larger; we have summoned the Saigon leaders, like tribal chieftains on a retainer, to a conference in an American state; we crowd the streets of Saigon with American generals (58 at last count) and visiting stateside dignitaries. In short, we have seized every opportunity to make clear to the world that this is an American war—and, in doing this, we have surely gone far to make the war unwinnable.

The proposition that our real enemy in Vietnam is China is basic to the policy of widening the war. It is the vital element in the Administration case. Yet the proof our leaders have adduced for this proposition has been exceedingly sketchy and almost perfunctory. It has been proof by ideology and proof by analogy. It has not been proof by reasoned argument or by concrete illustration.

The proof by ideology has relied on the syllogism that the Vietcong, North Vietnam and China are all Communist states and therefore must be part of the same conspiracy, and that, since the Vietcong are the weakest of the three, they must therefore be the spearhead of a coordinated Chinese plan of expansion. The Department of State, in spite of what has struck most people as a rather evident fragmentation of the Communist world, has hated to abandon the cozy old clichés about a centralized Communist conspiracy aimed at monolithic world revolution.

As late as May 9, 1965, after half a dozen years of public Russo-Chinese quarrelling, Thomas C. Mann, then No. 3 man in the department, could talk about "instruments of Sino-Soviet power" and "orders from the Sino-Soviet military bloc." As late as Jan. 28, 1966, the Secretary of State could still run on about "their world revolution," and again, on Feb. 18, about "the Communists" and their "larger design." While the department may have accepted the reality of the Russo-Chinese schism by September, 1966, the predominant tone is still to regard Asian Communism as a homogenous system of aggression. The premise of our policy has been that the Vietcong equal Hanoi and Hanoi equals Peking.

Obviously, the Vietcong, Hanoi and Peking have interests in common and strong ideological affinities. Obviously, Peking would rejoice in a Hanoi-Vietcong victory. But they also have divergent interests and purposes—and the divergencies may prove in the end to be stronger than the affinities. Recent developments in North Korea are instructive. If any country was bound to Peking by ties of gratitude, it was North Korea, which was preserved as an independent state by Chinese intervention 15 years ago. If any country today is at the mercy of Peking, it is again North Korea. When North Korea now declares in vigorous language its independence of China, does anyone suppose that North Vietnam, imbued with historic mistrust of China and led by that veteran Russian agent Ho Chi Minh, would have been more slavish in its attitude toward Peking?

The other part of the Administration case has been proof by analogy, especially the good old Munich analogy. "I'm not the village idiot," the Secretary of State recently confided to Stewart Alsop. "I know Hitler was an Austrian and Mao is a Chinese. . . . But what is common between the two situations is the phenomenon of aggression." The Vietnam war, President Johnson recently told the American Legion, "is meant to be the opening salvo in a series of bombardments or, as they are called in Peking, 'wars of liberation.'" If this technique works this week in Vietnam the Administration suggests, it will be tried next week in Uganda and Peru. But, if it is defeated in Vietnam, the Chinese will know that we will not let it succeed elsewhere.

"What happens in South Vietnam," the President cried at Omaha, "will determine—

yes, it will determine—whether ambitious and aggressive nations can use guerrilla warfare to conquer their weaker neighbors." The Secretary of State even described an exhortation made last year by the Chinese Defense Minister, Marshal Lien Piao, as a blueprint for world conquest comparable to Hitler's "Mein Kampf."

One thing is sure about the Vietnam riddle: it will not be solved by bad historical analogies. It seems a trifle forced, for example, to equate a civil war in what was for hundreds of years the entity of Vietnam (Marshall Ky, after all, is a North Vietnamese himself) with Hitler's invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia across old and well-established lines of national division; even the village idiot might grasp that difference.

When President Eisenhower invoked the Munich analogy in 1954 in an effort to involve the British in Indochina, Prime Minister Churchill, a pretty close student of Munich in his day, was unmoved. The Chinese have neither the overwhelmingly military power nor the timetable of aggression nor, apparently, the pent-up mania for instant expansion which would justify the Hitler parallel. As for the Lin Piao document, the Rand Corporation, which evidently read it with more care than the State Department bothered to do, concluded that, far from being Mao's "Mein Kampf," it was a message to the Vietcong that they could win "only if they rely primarily on their own resources and their own revolutionary spirit," and that it revealed "the lack, rather than the extent, of Peking's past and present control over Hanoi's actions."

In any case, guerrilla warfare is not a tactic to be mechanically applied by central headquarters to faraway countries. More than any other form of warfare, it is dependent on conditions and opportunities within the countries themselves. Whether there are wars of national liberation in Uganda and Peru will depend, not on what happens in Vietnam, but on what happens in Uganda and Peru.

One can agree that the containment of China will be a major problem for the next generation. But this does not mean that we must re-enact in Asia in the sixties the exact drama of Europe in the forties and fifties. The record thus far suggests that the force most likely to contain Chinese expansionism in Asia (and Africa, too) will be not Western intervention but local nationalism. Sometimes local nationalism may call on Western support—but not always. Countries like Burma and Cambodia preserve their autonomy with American assistance. The Africans have dealt with the Chinese on their own. The two heaviest blows recently suffered by Peking—the destruction of the Communist party in Indonesia and the declaration of independence by North Korea—took place without benefit of American patronage or rhetoric.

In the unpredictable decades ahead, the most effective bulwark against "international" Communism in some circumstances may well be national Communism. A rational policy of containing China could have recognized that a Communist Vietnam under Ho might be a better instrument of containment than a shaky Saigon regime led by right-wing mandarins or air force generals. Had Ho taken over all Vietnam in 1954, he might today be enlisting Soviet support to strengthen his resistance to Chinese pressure—and this situation, however appalling for the people of South Vietnam, would obviously be better for the United States than the one in which we are floundering today. And now, alas, it may be almost too late: the whole thrust of United States policy since 1954, and more than ever since the bombing of the North began, has been not to pry Peking and Hanoi apart but to drive them together.



Is there no way out? Are the only alternatives widening the war or disorderly and humiliating withdrawal? Surely, our statesmanship is not yet this bankrupt. I think a middle course is still possible if there were the will to pursue it. And this course must begin with a decision to stop widening and Americanizing the war—to limit our forces, actions, goals and rhetoric. Instead of bombing more places, sending in more troops, proclaiming ever more ardently that the fate of civilization will be settled in Vietnam, let us recover our cool and try to see the situation as it is: a horrid civil war in which Communist guerrillas, enthusiastically aided and now substantially directed from Hanoi, are trying to establish a Communist despotism in South Vietnam, not for the Chinese but for themselves. Let us understand that the ultimate problem here is not military but political. Let us adapt the means we employ to the end we seek.

Obviously, military action plays an indispensable role in the search for a political solution. Hanoi and the Vietcong will not negotiate so long as they think they can win. Since stalemate is a self-evident precondition to negotiation, we must have enough American armed force in South Vietnam to leave no doubt in the minds of our adversaries that they cannot hope for victory. They must also have no illusion about the prospect of an American withdrawal. The object of the serious opposition to the Johnson policy is to bring about not an American defeat but a negotiated settlement.

Therefore, holding the line in South Vietnam is essential. Surely, we already have enough American troops, firepower and installations in South Vietnam to make it clear that we cannot be beaten unless we choose to scuttle and run, which will not happen. The opponents of this strategy talk as if a holding action would put our forces under siege and relinquish all initiative to the enemy. This need not, of course, be so. It is possible to slow down a war without standing still; and, if our present generals can't figure out how to do this, then let us get generals who can. Generals Ridgway and Gavin could doubtless suggest some names. Moreover, there is a South Vietnamese army of some 600,000 men which can take all the initiative it wants. And if we are told that the South Vietnamese are unwilling or unable to fight the Vietcong, then we must wonder all the more about the political side of the war.

The object of our military policy, as observers like Henry Kissinger and James MacGregor Burns have proposed, should be the creation and stabilization of secure areas where the South Vietnamese might themselves undertake social and institutional development. Our resources should go, in the Vietnam jargon, more to clear-and-hold than to search-and-destroy (especially when search-and-destroy more often means search-and-drive-underground). We should get rid of those "one-star generals who," in the words of Sir Robert Thompson, "regard their tour in Vietnam as an opportunity to indulge in a year's big-game shooting from their helicopter howdahs at Government expense."

At the same time we should induce the Saigon Government to institute generous amnesty provisions of the kind which worked so well in the Philippines. And we should further increase the incentive to come over by persuading the South Vietnamese to abandon the torture of prisoners—a practice not only horrible in itself but superbly calculated to make the enemy fight to the bitter end. In the meantime we must end our own shameful collaboration with this barbarism and stop turning Vietcong prisoners over to the South Vietnamese when we know that torture is probable.

As for bombing the North, let us taper this off as prudently as we can. Bombing is

not likely to deter Hanoi any more in the future than it has in the past; and, given its limited military effect, the Administration's desire to gratify the Saigon Government and the American voter is surely not important enough to justify the risks of indefinite escalation. Moreover, so long as the bombing continues there is no chance of serious negotiation. Nor does the failure of the 37-day pause of last winter to produce a settlement refute this. Thirty-seven days were hardly enough to persuade our allies that we honestly wanted negotiation; so brief an interlude left no time for them to move on to the tricky job of persuading Hanoi. For Hanoi has substantial reasons for mistrusting negotiation—quite apart from Chinese pressure or its own hopes of victory. He has entered into negotiation with the West twice in the past—in 1946-47 and again in 1954—and each time, in his view, he lost at the conference table things he thought he had won on the battlefield.

For all our official talk about our readiness to go anywhere, talk to anyone, etc., it cannot be said that the Administration has pursued negotiation with a fraction of the zeal, imagination and perseverance with which it has pursued war. Indeed, some American scholars who have studied the matter believe that on a number of occasions when pressure for negotiation was mounting we have, for whatever reason, stepped up the war.<sup>1</sup>

Nor can it be said that the Administration has laid fairly before the American people the occasional signals, however faint, which have come from Hanoi—as in the early winter of 1965, when U Thant's mediation reached the point of selecting the hotel in Rangoon where talks might take place, until we killed the idea by beginning the bombing of the North. Nor, for all our declarations about "unconditional" negotiations, have we refrained from setting conditions—such as, for example, that we won't talk to the Vietcong unless they come to the conference table disguised as North Vietnamese. Though the Vietcong constitute the great bulk of the enemy force, they have been given little reason to think we will negotiate about anything except their unconditional surrender.

It is hard to see why we should not follow the precedent of Laos, when we admitted the Pathet Lao to the peace talks, and offer the Vietcong the prospect of a say in the future political life of South Vietnam—conditioned on their laying down their arms, opening up their territories and abiding by the ground rules of free elections. Nor is there reason to see why we have been so reluctant again to follow the Laos model and declare neutralization, under international guarantee, our long-run objective for Vietnam. An imaginative diplomacy would long since have discussed the ways and means of such neutralization with Russia, France, Britain and other interested countries. Unsatisfactory as the situation in Laos may be today, it is still incomparably better than the situation in South Vietnam.

On the other hand, negotiation is not an exclusive, or even primary, American responsibility. Along with a military stalemate, the other precondition of a diplomatic settlement is surely a civilian government in Saigon. Marshal Ky is one of those Frankenstein's monsters we delight in creating in our "client" countries, very much like the egregious General Phoumi Nosavan, who single-handedly blocked a settlement in Laos for two years. Like Phoumi, Ky evidently feels that Washington has committed itself

irrevocably to him—and why should he not after the laying on of hands at Honolulu?—and that, whatever he does, we cannot afford to abandon him.

Robert Shaplen, in the August 20 issue of *The New Yorker*, reported from Saigon that the atmosphere there "is being compared to the miasma that surrounded Diem and his tyrannical brother Ngo Dinh Nhu" and that "many Vietnamese believe that the Americans, having embraced Ky so wholeheartedly and supported him so long, are just as responsible as his Government for the recent repressive acts."

I am sure that President Johnson did not intend to turn over American policy and honor in Vietnam to Marshal Ky's glimcrack, bullyboy, get-rich-quick regime. The time is bound to come when Ky must learn the facts of life, as General Phoumi eventually and painfully learned them.

But why wait? In our whole time in Vietnam, there has never been a Government in Saigon which had the active loyalty of the countryside. It might be an agreeable experiment to encourage one to come into existence. Instead of identifying American interests with Ky and rebuffing the broader political impulses in South Vietnam, we should long since have welcomed a movement toward a civilian regime representing the significant political forces of the country and capable both of rallying the army and carrying forward programs of social reform. We should give such a Government all possible assistance in rebuilding and modernizing the political and institutional structures of South Vietnam. And if it should favor the neutralization of its country, if it should seek negotiation with the Vietcong, even if it should release us from our commitment to stay in Vietnam, we should not think that the world is coming to an end.

It is not too late to begin the deescalation of the war; nor would the reduction of our military effort damage our international influence. "There is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world," George Kennan has written, "by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives." France was stronger than ever after de Gaulle left Algeria, the Soviet Union suffered no lasting damage from pulling its nuclear missiles out of Cuba. And the policy of de-escalation recommended here is, of course, something a good deal less than withdrawal.

De-escalation could work, if there were the will to pursue it . . . This is the hard question. The Administration, disposed to the indiscriminate use of power, enmeshed in the grinding cogs of the escalation machine, committed to the thesis that China is the enemy in Vietnam, obviously could not turn to de-escalation without considerable inner upheaval. The issue in the United States in the months to come will be whether President Johnson's leadership is sufficiently resilient and forbearing to permit a change in the direction of policy and arrest what is coming increasingly to seem an accelerating drift toward a great and unnecessary catastrophe.

(Mrs. DWYER (at the request of Mr. WATKINS) was granted permission to extend her remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mrs. DWYER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

#### JUST NOT NEEDED

(Mr. OTTINGER (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

<sup>1</sup> See "The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam," by Franz Schurmann, Peter Dale Scott and Reginald Zelnik of the University of California; to be published in October by Fawcett Books (paperback) and Beacon Press (hardcover).

22058

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

September 19, 1966

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, once again I am compelled to rise to speak against wasteful and unnecessary Federal spending.

This time I am concerned over the Tellico Dam project included under title IV in the Public Works Appropriation Act of 1967—H.R. 17787—which is scheduled to come before the House this week.

This project, which is mentioned on page 83 of the Public Works Committee report on the bill—House Report No. 2044—may seem innocuous. It calls for a \$3.2 million appropriation for a dam on the Little Tennessee River in southeastern Tennessee for "multipurpose river development." Now that sounds like water resource development, flood control, and maybe even power development—in short, all the good things for which TVA has become famous.

Frankly, Mr. Speaker, that simply is not the case with Tellico Dam. Tellico Dam is purely and simply a "pork barrel" project that will have the taxpayers of the United States footing a \$42 million bill for a risky 5,000-acre real estate speculation.

The so-called "general economic development" that TVA has in mind in the Tellico Dam project is really to lure industry from other sections of the country to this region and the way TVA intends to go about it is to condemn private land for resale at a "profit" to private industry.

I find it very hard to understand why TVA should ever be involved in this type of "pork barrel" project at any time. But, certainly, this Tellico Dam scheme is completely out of line now when restraint on Federal spending is so urgently needed.

On top of everything else, this is not a very sound business proposition. I am informed that TVA tried a similar venture once before in this area with no success. They acquired 1,000 acres on Melton Hill reservoir and, as of now, they have only been able to sell one 25-acre parcel.

TVA says that the Tellico Dam situation is different. They say that it has highway, rail, and water transportation resources that were lacking at Melton Hill. However, I am sure that they were just as confident at Melton Hill. Speaking as a businessman I would want to know a great deal more about the market before I would sink \$42 million in a land speculation like this. I do not think that TVA ought to go into this kind of business, but if they do, then the stockholders—the U.S. taxpayers—must have better assurance of the soundness of the project than we have seen so far.

I doubt very much whether this Tellico Dam project would have gotten this far if TVA were required to come to Congress for authorization. Clearly the project is widely opposed by local groups and by national conservation organizations. I have received many letters from people in Tennessee asking my help in stopping TVA. The Chattanooga News-Free Press summarized their argument in an editorial last Friday, September 16:

JUST NOT NEEDED

Just below Chattanooga, work is progressing on the Nickajack Dam. This is an exam-

ple of a dam that is needed, is fully justified, that is reasonable in concept and execution.

It is to replace the present Hale's Bar Dam, that has been undermined by water leaks through porous limestone formations. Nickajack also will provide huge locks to allow better use of the Tennessee River by shipping that currently is bottlenecked at Hale's Bar.

In sharp contrast with the demonstrable need for Nickajack Dam is the proposal for building the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River.

Perhaps you have heard most about the Tellico Dam as a result of the protests of nature lovers, conservationists and fishermen who lament that the Tellico Dam would destroy one of the last natural rivers in our section. In addition, there is the stronger point that there is no real need for the Tellico Dam.

It is not justified by power production needs. It is not justified by navigation demands. It is not supported as a flood control measure. The only significant argument that is made for the Tellico Dam is that it would open new industrial sites. This is a poor argument when (1) there are many, many available industrial sites in the area that are not yet in use, and (2) it is not the business of the Federal Government to take the role of real estate developer.

It appears that the real reason behind the Tellico Dam is that its proponents just have run out of something else to do for the time being. Just yesterday, the House Appropriations Committee approved expenditure of three million dollars to start the project—a small forerunner of many millions of your dollars that would follow.

Here is one excellent example of a wise place to cut expenditures in this time of galloping inflation, wasteful Federal spending, deficit financing and costly war.

Mr. Speaker, I have inquired and found that more than 50 national and local organizations are strongly opposed to Tellico Dam. I would like to present a partial listing of these organizations for the RECORD:

#### ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVELY OPPOSED TO THE TELlico DAM PROJECT

The Wilderness Society.  
National Wildlife Federation.  
National Audubon Society.  
National Parks Association.  
Wildlife Management Institute.  
The Nature Conservancy.  
American Forestry Association.  
Izaak Walton League of America.  
America Pulpwood Association.  
Defenders of Wildlife.  
Trout Unlimited.  
Citizens Committee on Natural Resources.  
Tennessee Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution.  
Tennessee Game and Fish Commission.  
Tennessee Conservation League.  
Tennessee Outdoor Press Association.  
Tennessee Farm Bureau Federation.  
Tennessee Livestock Association.  
Tennessee Federation of Garden Clubs.  
Southeastern Outdoor Writers Association.  
Association for Preservation of the Little Tennessee River.  
The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians.  
Cherokee Nation, Tribe of Oklahoma.  
Fort Loudon Association.  
Monroe County Farm Bureau.  
Monroe County Farmers Cooperative.  
Monroe County Livestock Association.  
McMinn County Farm Bureau.  
Blount County Livestock Association.  
Greenback Farmers Cooperative.  
Vonnore Lions Club.  
Childhowee Rod and Gun Club.  
Chattanooga Trout Association.  
Highland Sportsman's Club.  
Cherokee Sportsman's Conservation Association.

East Tennessee Historical Society, McMinn Chapter.

East Tennessee Duck Hunters Association.  
Sweetwater Valley Feeder Pig Association.  
Knox County Young Republican Club.  
Southern Field and Creel Club.  
West Knoxville Sertoma Club.  
Knoxville Men's Garden Club.  
Knoxville Retriever Club.  
Cherokee Rifle and Pistol Club, Incorporated.

Association for Preservation of Tennessee Antiquities.

Ossoli Circle—Knoxville.  
Middle Tennessee Conservancy Council.  
Scout Troop 3057.  
Y-Indian Guides.  
Appalachian Anglers.  
Society of American Foresters, Kentucky-Tennessee Section.  
James White Chapter, DAR, Knoxville.  
Chamber of Commerce, Athens, Tennessee.  
Outdoorsmen, Inc.—Kingsport.

Knowing of this broad opposition, would a congressional committee have authorized this Tellico Dam scheme? I doubt it—certainly, not without a good deal more information.

Abuses such as this proposed dam indicate that new legislation may be necessary to bring agencies such as TVA back into the Federal Government and under the normal authority of Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I would not pretend to be an expert on the economics of this Tellico Dam project. I do not have to be one to see the dangers and the holes left by unanswered, and unasked, questions.

For example, TVA predicts that it will generate \$15 million in economic benefits from the project. Almost \$11 million of that total is to come from land sales, but what if those land sales do not materialize? If those land sales do not materialize—and they have not in Melton Hill—almost 75 percent of that economic benefit goes down the drain.

Mr. Speaker, I share the suspicion of the Chattanooga editor that the real reason for the Tellico Dam project is that the TVA has just run out of other things to do. We cannot afford this kind of "busy work" in this time of mounting inflation.

Furthermore, I do not believe that we can or should afford any busy work that damages and perhaps destroys valuable natural resources.

I have never fished in the Little Tennessee River and I consider it my loss, for the experts tell me that this is one of the great unspoiled stretches of river in that part of the country. They say that this dam will wreck this, and I believe them.

Along with the people of Tennessee, the numerous conservation agencies and the great newspapers of Tennessee, I urge my colleagues to support an amendment to the public works appropriations bill to delete the appropriation for the Tellico Dam project.

#### INTERVIEW WITH GEN. WALLACE M. GREENE, JR., U.S. MARINE CORPS

(Mr. KEOGH (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)



September 19, 1966

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

22059

Mr. KEOGH. Mr. Speaker, recently the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, Gen. Wallace M. Greene, Jr., returned to the United States from the war zone in Vietnam, where he made a comprehensive survey of our military position and our relations with the Vietnamese people. General Greene, who is completing 3 productive years in the exacting role of Commandant, was interviewed by members of the staff of U.S. News & World Report.

His penetrating comments, as published in the September 5, issue of that magazine, should be read by every interested American:

**GENERAL GREENE TELLS THE STORY OF VIETNAM WAR—INTERVIEW WITH THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS**

(NOTE.—After a year of sustained U.S. effort in Vietnam, at a steadily rising cost, the returns are starting to come in—and they're mixed.)

(The military picture is improving, but how rapidly? Will the Marines be able to link up their coastal beachheads? How about the Delta—will U.S. have to go after Reds there, too?)

(Mainly: Can U.S. ever win a military victory?)

(Then there's the pacification side of it. It's agreed that job is just starting. How long will it take—a year, or five, or 20?)

(For authoritative answers, "U.S. News & World Report" invited to its conference room the Commandant of the Marine Corps, just back from the war zone. This is an exclusive interview with members of the magazine's staff.)

Q. General Greene, did you bring back any dominant impression from your latest trip to Vietnam?

A. The thing that impressed me most was the tremendous progress that's been made in the seven months since my last inspection—progress which to me augurs of a definite victory.

Q. What kind of progress?

A. The magnitude of the entire effort—the combat elements, the installations, the supporting establishments, storerooms, workshops, barracks for the men, recreation areas, and so forth—it is all just tremendous. That's No. 1. No. 2 is the progress made in the pacification of the countryside in the Northern Provinces where the Marines are located, and the success that we're having in the search-and-destroy operations. There is a very definite and noticeable progress.

Q. But aren't the Marines really prisoners in those beachheads that they are in along the coast?

A. No, they aren't—that's just the point. The beachheads are operating bases; they're combat bases on the sea from which we've not only been operating, but which we're gradually expanding. As you know, we went in there in March of 1965 and established three beachheads, with limited perimeters. We've been expanding the perimeters ever since.

Actually, as I tell a lot of our Marine officers, here you are seeing the influence of sea power on history, really.

Q. What are the three beachheads, General?

A. The principal one is at Da Nang, the first beachhead we established. The second is about 45 miles to the north, at Phu Bai, which is near the ancient city of Hue. The third is some 65 miles south of Da Nang at Chu Lai.

Q. How fast are you pushing out from these beachheads? Will you be able to link up all three before long?

A. This is the thing that really makes me feel optimistic. Some 17 months ago, when we first went ashore, we assumed responsi-

bility for less than 10 square miles of real estate, with a very small number of Vietnamese living within the perimeters.

Today, inside the Marine Corps' area of responsibility, there are 1,620 square miles of ground and 900,000 Vietnamese civilians. I would call this progress.

More than that: The perimeters are growing, they keep expanding, and I feel that within a reasonable time we're going to be able to amalgamate these beachheads into a single beachhead, which will be proof not only to our own people that our programs are succeeding out there, but also a clear signal to Ho Chi Minh that he's losing.

Q. When would you estimate the linkup will come?

A. I'd say that part of the program should come within the next few months. Now, of course, this doesn't mean that the military campaign is going to be over, because, although we will have torn out the guerrilla infrastructure from the villages and hamlets and forced the enemy out where we can get at him in the jungles and mountains to the west, it simply will mean that we've done the preliminary surgery.

Next, we have to get on with the pacification program, which is going to take a considerable period of time and also is going to require U.S. military and civilian effort.

Q. For a long time?

A. For a long time. Look how long we have been in Europe—20 years. How long have we been in Korea? Fifteen years. The point is this is a long-term job. It is not necessarily a long-term military job. We may get over that part of it but the pacification job is going to take a long time.

Q. Do you have enough men to do the military job?

A. We have 56,000 Marines in South Vietnam, enough men to slowly expand our perimeters as we're doing now. However, of course, if additional forces were to be introduced, the action could be expedited, accelerated.

Q. How far from the sea do you intend to extend the beachheads?

A. From the sea westward to the mountains, back far enough to cover the great majority of people living in our area of responsibility.

Once you get to the mountains, you'll find very few people. There are 10,000 square miles in the First Corps area, but the bulk of the population—I'd say 90 per cent of the population—is actually centered in just one fourth of the total territory—in the sliver of flatland adjacent to the sea. We're talking about a region with a coastline 165 miles long and 8 to 14 miles in width.

Q. How many people are concentrated in this coastal area, altogether?

A. Some 2.7 million, plus some 200,000 refugees. Very few are in the mountains. It is very, very rugged country up there. In fact, they have what they call a "double canopy," with not only the ordinary tree-top-level growth, but an extension of this growth at a second level. This is no country in which anyone wants to live. It's tremendously rough.

We know that many of the enemy suffer from malaria and dysentery. It's hard to get food. They've had to execute forays toward the coast in order to get rice to eat, in many cases.

Q. Would you be in favor of going north as well as west, and extending a barrier parallel to the seventeenth parallel, south of the so-called DMZ—demilitarized zone—to stop infiltration?

A. In theory, this presents an inviting picture, but it becomes very questionable when you examine the logistics required, the engineers required, the time required and the troops who must keep it under surveillance. There's a serious question as to whether this would be the proper technique or not.

With the mobility that we have in the way

of helicopters, and the ever-improving intelligence that we have, it would be much better, instead of having a barrier type of defense, to have a mobile, quick-reacting defense to hit the enemy wherever they may enter the country.

Furthermore, what do you really have when you have a barrier along the DMZ? The enemy can always make an end run around it. What are you going to do—extend a fence across the entire continent of Asia?

Q. Are the two Marine divisions in Vietnam actually enough to link up those beachheads, and do all the other things required of them?

A. If we were to put additional troops in there, we could hasten the effort.

Q. Do you have those in reserve, available somewhere in the world?

A. We have the newly organized Fifth Division on the West Coast. We've already started the deployment of one of its regiments, the 26th Regiment, to the Western Pacific.

Two battalion landing teams are already either in place or en route, along with the regimental headquarters. They'll come under the command of the Ninth Amphibious Marine Brigade on Okinawa. The other two regiments of the division are being organized on the West Coast, with one battalion in Kaneohe on Oahu.

Q. Those are regulars?

A. These are regulars, made up of volunteers. Now, in addition to this, of course, we have the Second Division and air wing on the East Coast of the U.S.—in North Carolina, at Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point. These are in a ready status to meet contingencies in the Atlantic Ocean basin and also in the Mediterranean or Europe. We could, if necessary, draw down on this air-ground team. We wouldn't like to do that. Then the third source would be our Fourth Marine Division and wing team, which is our Reserve outfit. I can say, based on my own experience, that the Reserve is in the best ready status that it's ever been in its history.

Q. How many men are there in the Marine Reserve?

A. We have about 48,000 in the Organized Reserve and about 56,000 in our Class 3 Ready Reserve.

Q. If you expand your forces in Vietnam, will you have to call up any of your Reserve units?

A. Since we've had a gradual intensification of effort in South Vietnam, we have been able to avoid calling up the Fourth Marine Division—the Reserve outfit—and, instead, we were able to organize the Fifth Division entirely out of volunteers. I thought that this was the proper thing to do and so recommended, because I want to keep that Fourth Division as a "Sunday punch." They're able to get under way within 60 days after they're called.

If we had a real serious escalation or emergency, we could call them up and move them quickly.

Q. How long does it take to form a new division like the Fifth and get it effective for operation?

A. The total organization of the Fifth Division will take approximately 12 months. We started organizing in March of this year.

As far as heavy equipment is concerned, I'd say it will take about 18 months to get everything we need in the way of tanks and artillery and trucks.

But remember, we're organizing it by small combat units—our battalion landing teams—and, as I said, we've already deployed the first of these. But the total process will not be completed, as far as people go, until March of 1967.

Q. Is the size of the Marine Corps itself going to have to go up in order to meet the planning?

A. We're authorized an end strength of 278,000, which we'll reach by end of cal-

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endar 1966. Unless there's an intensification of effort in South Vietnam, this is the level at which we expect to operate.

Q. Do you expect to get another division in Vietnam soon?

A. We don't necessarily have to have another Marine division in South Vietnam. We might get help from Vietnamese Marine units. As you probably know, there is a very fine Vietnamese Marine Corps, and also a Korean Marine Corps. The Korean marines are now in South Vietnam. Altogether, there are five battalions of Vietnamese marines. Both of these units are outstanding, and we'd be very happy to have them operating with us.

Q. What are they doing now?

A. The Vietnamese marines are in strategic reserve in the country. Actually, during our last two combat operations, "Hastings" and "Colorado," we've had at least two of their battalions operating with us. Many of their officers and men have been trained in our schools here in the States.

There are many, many Koreans and a great many Vietnamese officers and noncommissioned officers whom we personally know. This makes combined action on the battlefield an efficient operation.

Q. General, are the Marines spending as much time actually in combat in this war as they have in past wars?

A. This is not like many past wars. Actually, we have two programs under way, and we try to keep them in balance. As I mentioned, one is our search-and-destroy operation; the other is pacification. These programs, incidentally, apply throughout the country and are used by the Army as well as the Marine Corps.

Q. Exactly what do you mean by "search and destroy"?

A. The phrase really describes it very well. We search for organized units of the enemy until we locate them. Once they are located, we immediately get out there, usually by helicopter, and strike and try to destroy or fragment them. That's the first program: Find the enemy, fix him and kill him.

The second program—and in the long run the more important of the two—is our pacification program, which is also known under the terms of "civic action," "revolutionary development" or "rehabilitation." This program consists of pulling out of the village and hamlet structure the Viet Cong who have been living in these areas for years—identifying them, encouraging them to return to the Government side through the "open arms" defector program, capturing, killing them, or forcing them into the jungle and mountains to the west—and then starting on community programs to get people back on their feet.

Q. How in the world do you identify the enemy in any particular village?

A. Back in the 1940s the Marine Corps, which has had a great deal of experience in small wars, developed a "cordon system" for the pacification of small areas. We're actually using this method—we call it the "County Fair" operation. I saw one of these operations actually being conducted during my recent visit, and it was most interesting.

What we do: We select a hamlet, say of 500 or 600 people. We put a cordon around that hamlet, usually before daylight. Then, with South Vietnamese troops, we enter the hamlet, assemble all the people, screen each individual, move the people out of the hamlet into an enclosure where we can start giving them medical treatment, feeding them and issuing identity cards. This takes about three days.

Now, if any of the Viet Cong in the village attempt to escape, the cordon snares them. If they attempt to hide, we find out where they are and dig them out. In this particular village, we killed 10 Viet Cong and found a number of them hiding in the wells.

Q. In the wells?

A. It was a very clever procedure in which, just below the water level, they would dig into the side of the well and then upward, and hollow out an enclosure big enough for two men. Then they would build an air conduit into the well itself just above the water level.

When we entered the village, they'd dive into the well, go up into the enclosure and hide. We attempted to get them out by putting tear gas into the wells.

Q. Do you occupy these hamlets?

A. Yes, and that's an important thing. When this screening operation is over, we then leave one Marine squad, plus two squads of local militia.

Q. That thins out your forces—

A. That's the point I was going to bring out. In theory, this particular operation as soon as it's completed, should be taken over by the Vietnamese themselves, either by the local police and militia, or by South Vietnamese Army troops.

But the fact is there are not enough—and not enough trained—individuals to do this, so, for the past 18 months, we've had to divert marines from their normal search-and-destroy operations into the pacification program.

Q. Is anything being done in Saigon about this?

A. Everything possible is being done to expedite the training of Vietnamese civilians and military for the pacification program. Actually, while I was in Saigon I went on down to Vung Tau, which is the revolutionary-development, cadre-training center—a most interesting place where they had some 5,000 civilian Vietnamese under training, to be organized into 59-man teams to be inserted into these village and hamlet areas to take over after the "County Fair" screening operation has been completed. They are making progress.

Q. How do the Marines work alongside these South Vietnamese militia in the villages?

A. Very closely. We have what we call combined-action companies, which are rapidly growing in number in the First Corps area, consisting usually of a squad or a platoon of U.S. Marines, and then several squads or two or three platoons of Vietnamese militia. We work with them, train them, develop their leadership, actually operate with them against the Viet Cong. Eventually we'll be able to pull our units out, and they will operate by themselves. These people are good fighters. They're loyal, and they work with us in ambushes and operations at night. In fact, one company I saw was on such close terms with our marines that they were wearing U.S. Marine Corps insignia on one of the lapels of their pajamas as an indication of how they felt.

Another most interesting thing is the attitude of the young marines in these combined-action companies.

I talked with a tall, lean, lanky Texan. I'd say the boy, a corporal, is about 20 years old. He hardly let me go, he was so enthusiastic about what he was accomplishing. He showed me his unit. He showed me where they were billeted. He introduced me to the village officials. He told me about their operations at night against the Viet Cong. He took me down and showed me the school they just got back into operation. They had six classrooms and about 200 kids. He took me in and introduced me to the teachers.

Then this happened: The corporal's next-in-command said he was going to extend his tour in Vietnam for six months, because he had been told he could have a unit of his own like this in the next village. You see, these men really believe in what they're accomplishing.

Q. Have you political stability in your area now?

A. Yes, we do have political stability. We had turbulence up there in April and May,

in the vicinity of Hue. The city has quieted down. Da Nang has returned to normal.

But here is the vital thing: Even at the height of the political emergency up in First Corps, the fabric which we'd built over the period of a year in the countryside, among the people, held firm.

Q. The trouble was in the cities?

A. Absolutely. Out in the hamlets and villages, where we had our pacification program under way with the Vietnamese, the people continued to cooperate with us, and we had no difficulty at all. It was only in the urban areas, where the agitation was under way, that there was some difficulty.

Q. Do these people in the countryside have any feeling of allegiance to Saigon?

A. Their allegiance is principally to their own family, to their village or their hamlet, to their religion, or to small groups. This is a major problem, because the idea of voluntary allegiance to a government is new to them. In the past, governments have always been forced on them.

This is the problem that's going to take years. General Walt (Lieut. Gen. Lewis Walt), who is commanding the Marines out there, feels that one of the keys is in the young Vietnamese people. That's why he's spending so much effort on helping to get the schools re-established.

Q. Did you say the Marines are building schools?

A. Of course, and we're not only getting assistance from our Government through the AID program, but many thousands of people in the United States have made contributions to the Marine Corps Reserve civic-action program. General Walt has had over \$350,000 made available to him, and most of this he's spending in the re-establishment of the schools. You can't go out there and see these children without realizing how important this project is. These are really fine-looking boys and girls. They're smart. I've talked with a lot of them. They're anxious to go to school. And here is the basis, I feel, of hope for the country.

Q. But that's a long-time proposition—

A. It is, but we should ask: Is it worthwhile or not?

Intertwined with our pledge and our help to this small country, which I personally don't feel we should waver on, we have our own national-security interests, too, that we must remember. We didn't select this battlefield in South Vietnam; nevertheless, it's one on which we can adequately meet and cope with the enemy.

If we were to withdraw from South Vietnam, we'd not only lose tremendous prestige throughout the world, but it would only be a matter of time before we'd have to go in and meet the threat somewhere else, either on the Subcontinent, in the Middle East, maybe in Australia and New Zealand, perhaps Thailand, which is already threatened in the northeast corner, and, finally, perhaps even on our own doorstep, in Latin America.

We either have to choose to meet the enemy here, or face the almost certainty of having to meet him somewhere else, on another battlefield, where the price of admission will be many times what it's been so far.

## WE CONTROL SEA AND AIR

Q. Isn't true that the Joint Chiefs of Staff at one time opposed the idea of fighting another land war in Asia?

A. This problem came up, as you know, in 1961, when it looked as if we were going to become involved in Laos.

Of course, that would have been a most difficult problem, because you have in Laos a landlocked area, extremely rough country, very limited roads, practically no railroads, far from the sea. This would have been a most difficult operation to mount and to sustain.

But we can't always select the area in which we have to meet our enemy. Although we eventually didn't go into Laos, we found



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ourselves slowly slipping into the situation in which we find ourselves now in South Vietnam. Fortunately, we're fighting in a country where we have ready access from the sea, and we control the sea and control the air.

Q. Would it help the war much in the South if the port of Haiphong in the North were to be shut down tight, by mining the harbor or by other means?

A. You've raised a question that's not only military but also political. The political factor has to be measured, and this has been one of the determinants in examining the problem. We can get along—and are—with-out this action being taken.

Q. Is the flow of supplies slowing from the North?

A. Somewhat. I think where you notice it is in a drop-off of motorized vehicles, such as trucks, and also in boats that are propelled by motors. This is a result, of course, of our attacks on their oil-storage facilities in the North. However, infiltration of men still continues at about 4,500 to 5,000 men a month.

Q. General, what do you think of Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky's idea that we have to invade North Vietnam in order to end this war?

A. Well, several times the Prime Minister has made various statements which are his own personal opinions. I feel that the real key in this war is whether we have success or failure in ripping out the guerrilla infrastructure from these villages and hamlets. I think the North Vietnamese are watching this, because they know that, if they lose the people in the South, they lose the war.

Q. Just who is it that you're fighting—mostly Southern Viet Cong, or regular-army troops from North Vietnam?

A. When we went initially into South Vietnam, into First Corps area, our principal enemy was the "black pajama" guerrilla. Now, the interesting thing: During my last visit, Operation Colorado was in progress. We had just thwarted an ambush. There were some 200 bodies of the enemy scattered around this village in which the ambush had been set up. In looking over the dead, and also looking over a group of prisoners which our marines had taken, we found the bulk of these people were North Vietnamese, with only a sprinkling of guerrillas. To me, this is a significant indication—that they have found it necessary to introduce North Vietnamese into the country in order to get on with the campaign that the guerrillas are actually losing.

Q. Do the marines take many prisoners?

A. We aren't taking as many prisoners as we'd like. But I saw about 20 during this Operation Colorado. There had been 20 prisoners captured.

Q. Do they tend to fight until they're killed?

A. No, you find a variety. Some of them fight until they're so badly wounded that we can take them prisoner. Others surrender. Others, even at the early part of the fight, just desert and come over to our side.

Q. Don't the Communists have an endless supply of men?

A. They have a tremendous manpower pool in the North, of course, and they can decide, if they want to, to continue a war of attrition over a long period of time. But the point is: What are they going to gain in this sort of operation if they see, first, that they've lost the people and, two, that we're determined to see the effort through?

Q. Who are those "black pajama" guerrillas?

A. Most are local people, the people who were born in the villages and hamlets of South Vietnam, frequently led by cadres trained in the North and reinfilitrated into the South. By virtue of the fact that they are the only ones in a village that have arms,

for example, they have taken over the village and they control the people.

Q. What's their motivation?

A. They have been sold the Communist idea—that's one motivation.

Q. Can the regular Northern troops be infiltrated into the Southern villages, into the infrastructure? Will they be accepted there?

A. No, that's just the point. We've taken a number of Northern-born prisoners who, in the first place, don't know the countryside and, secondly, are not accepted by the people. In fact, the Viet Cong themselves are not accepted by the people. Once the people are convinced that the Americans and the Vietnamese that come in—in the military units—are going to stay, then we start getting information from them as to where the Communist fighters are, who they are where they're hiding, where their caches are. This is, again, a most encouraging part of this whole operation.

## MAJOR ELEMENTS FROM NORTH

Q. Would this suggest that the usefulness of the North Vietnamese forces is largely confined to uninhabited areas?

A. Northerners are alien in the South, but the Communist side—our enemy—would introduce them into any area where they felt that they could gain a military advantage. For example, in the Second Corps area, which is in the central part of South Vietnam, the plateau area around Pleiku and Kontum, they've been introducing major elements in order to meet the U.S. Army's airmobile division in battle.

Q. Where do they come from? How do they get there?

A. They come down through Laos, along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and infiltrate across the border through innumerable ingresses. I've seen some of these. For instance, one is the Ba Long Valley up in the First Corps area. This is a deep valley that comes right across from Laos, right through the mountains into the area in the vicinity of Hue. This is a natural path—in a natural ingress.

Q. They come on foot?

A. They come on foot a good deal of the way. However, in their initial movement out of North Vietnam, they ride trucks. They ride until they get down to the place where there are only trails, and then they infiltrate by foot along the trails.

Q. How are they supplied?

A. They're supplied by truck and also—as they have been in many other previous wars—by pack, by coolie, by bicycle.

Q. Do you agree with the theory that this war might just fade away if the enemy gets the idea that he is losing?

A. I certainly think it's a possibility. I think Ho Chi Minh, as he watches the situation in the South and sees that he's losing control, may then decide that the easiest way is temporarily to fade out of the picture in hopes that we'll leave the country—or that at a later opportunity he'll be able to infiltrate with political teams and take over. This would be one prospect. It's happened before, and it's an easy way to do it without any loss of prestige.

## WHY THE DELTA IS VITAL

Q. You are optimistic about the situation in the Northern Provinces, where the Marines have been located—but are things as bright in the Southern Provinces, in the Mekong Delta? What is the situation there?

A. The Delta, as all of us well know, is a tremendous area with a long seacoast, a network of waterways—the rice bowl certainly of South Vietnam and possibly of Southeast Asia—5 million people who offer not only a tax base for the guerrillas but also a recruiting base. It is an area of the utmost importance.

I heard one of the leading officials of South Vietnam say that the war started in the

Delta and probably will have to finish there. Perhaps that is an accurate forecast.

Q. Is a pacification program under way in the Delta?

A. There is a program under way, but much remains to be done. The program being conducted now is under the auspices of South Vietnamese military units.

Also, of course, there are parts of the Delta area which are under the control of certain religious groups who are bitterly opposed to the Viet Cong. But there's a tremendous job to be done in the Delta area, because there's so much land to be covered and so many people and hamlets and villages to be pacified.

Q. Is that a different military problem from the one in the northern areas?

A. Yes. In the north, although we have rivers running down to the sea, we don't have the tremendous marshes and rice paddies you find in the Delta.

In the Delta, you have a multitude of rivers and streams throughout. Then, of course, you're on the ocean, with a very long coastline. In addition to that, you're next to the Cambodian border, which also poses a problem.

Q. How do you deal with this problem?

A. The job certainly can be done. There's nothing insurmountable about it. It's going to take people, it's going to take equipment, and it's going to take time.

Q. Do the Communists have organized units in the Delta, or do they operate as individuals pretty much?

A. They operate just as they do in the rest of the country—as individuals and as small guerrilla bands.

Q. How do they supply themselves?

A. Principally from the countryside, so far as food is concerned. Their ammunition has been brought in across the border or across the coast.

Q. Are we getting geared up for this kind of war in the Delta?

A. We're always planning ahead for possible operations, not only in the Delta, but throughout the country.

Q. Will it take the same sort of effort in the Delta as in the First Corps area—the occupation of villages?

A. Yes, the same two programs—search-and-destroy and pacification—apply here just as much as they do up in the mountainous northern portion of the country.

Q. Aren't those villages difficult in the Delta—very difficult to guard because they stretch for miles along canals?

A. Here, again, the problem essentially is the same as we have farther north. What was tried before, unsuccessfully, was to set up the so-called strategic-hamlet program in which the hamlets were fortified, but their defense was left to the people, or to very poorly trained militia.

Under the system we're using now, well-trained units are left in these areas to hold them. These units are not only our own military and the South Vietnamese military, but also the "revolutionary-development cadre" teams—the development teams that are being trained.

Q. As this develops, it's going to take tremendous manpower, isn't it?

A. It already is taking tremendous manpower. You have about 700,000 men under arms from South Vietnam itself, of course, and we've got about 290,000 of our own troops there. The Koreans have over 20,000. The Australians are represented, and so are the New Zealanders. A contingent from the Philippines is expected.

The one thing that comes out of any discussion of this situation is the magnitude of the task to be done.

Q. Is it going to take as many more people as we have over there now?

A. I wouldn't want to speculate on how long it would take or how many troops it

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would take. But let me say this: It will take a long time, and it will take a large number of troops.

Q. Are the South Vietnamese proving good soldiers?

A. Yes, they are. When you remember that these people have been fighting and dying for 20 years, to think that they're still in the fighting business is a remarkable thing.

We find that these people, if they're well led, will fight well. We've had scores of marines operating as advisers with their units, and they speak most highly of them. If they are led properly, they are good fighters.

Q. Are the Viet Cong good fighters, too?

A. Very good fighters—dangerous fighters. During Operation Colorado, the Viet Cong who were there fought until they were killed right in their positions. They didn't run away. They fought. They're good fighters. They are well-equipped. They have good weapons.

## WEAPONS USED BY REDS

Q. What are the weapons—Chinese?

A. Most of the weapons that I've seen are of Soviet design, manufactured in China.

Q. These are small arms?

A. Small arms and some antiaircraft weapons. Of course, we know the surface-to-air missile equipment in North Vietnam is provided by the Soviet Union.

Q. What about the increase in casualties, General?

A. I don't think our casualties have been extraordinary. We've had about 1,350 men killed to date, and 8,000 wounded. That is just in the Marine Corps. The bulk of those wounded returned to duty.

The medical treatment our men are receiving now is really outstanding. We're losing less than 2 per cent of our wounded in this campaign out there, and it's due to the advances that have been made in military medical treatment. For example, we are getting people that are struck on the front line back in the States, undergoing final treatment, in five days' time.

One incident that struck me while I was at Chu Lai: We had a boy that had just come in from the front lines, badly wounded. I was in talking with him and decorated him with a Purple Heart. Two days later, when I was at Clark Field at the Philippines, I went into an evacuation plane that was about to take off for Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, D.C., and the first man I saw was this boy whom I had seen in the hospital at Chu Lai.

## MORALE: HOW GI'S FEEL

Q. How is morale?

A. Again, on this trip, like on other trips, I never found a single wounded man—and I include many Army and Air Force and Navy—who ever complained to me over the fact that he was wounded.

When I got to Japan, I went down to Yokosuka to the naval hospital to see the wounded. As I was going along the wards, one of the nurses came to me and said: "There's a wounded man, a corporal over there, and he requests mast with you." Well, you know what mast is: It's a session a commander gives on request to any one of his men who wants to present a problem or complaint or ask for help.

So I went over to this boy. He was badly wounded in the stomach and in one leg. He was so badly hurt that he couldn't sit up in bed. He could just lie there. He couldn't speak very loudly, so I bent over. And he said to me: "General, I know I'm going to be all right. It's going to take a few weeks, and I have just one thing I want to ask you, and that is that, when I'm able to walk, I want to return to my unit."

Now, here was a boy 19 years old, making that kind of a request. You find this attitude everywhere in South Vietnam—a feeling that they've finally got the thing under way.

They know that they can whip this enemy that they face. They've done it every time that they've met them in any major operation of any sort. They know that the tremendous power of the United States is behind them, as evidenced by the ammunition, food and installations that are going into the country. They feel in their own minds that this campaign is going to be a success.

Q. General, are you confident—

A. Just two more points about morale that struck me:

I got to Okinawa, and I was really astonished to find out that they had a blood-donor campaign, and the marines who were going through Okinawa on their way down to South Vietnam were contributing blood.

The other thing that struck me was the fact we had lots of units in South Vietnam that were over 50 per cent—and some of them almost 100 per cent—in U.S. savings-bond purchases. In fact, in one place in Chu Lai I ran into a supply-support unit which had a sign listing its savings-bond activity—90 per cent—and down at the bottom it said: "We believe in the U.S.A." I thought that was something that people back here in the United States might think about.

Q. Are you satisfied that your men are getting the right kind of training before they are sent out to fight?

A. You bet I am. The marines who are going out to South Vietnam are going out there prepared to fight. They aren't going out there to learn on the job. They know their jobs before they go. We have a tremendous training system under way now, and we are introducing every scrap of information that we develop in South Vietnam into our training system, so that the marines that leave the United States, both the professionals and also the short-timers, are being given very detailed, thorough instruction in booby traps, mines, enemy techniques, methods of ambushes, and all the counters that are used by our own troops.

Q. How long is a Marine tour?

A. A Marine tour is 13 months, portal to portal—U.S. to U.S. It means 12 months out there and about two weeks out, two weeks back, including the processing.

Q. General Greene, are the military services given a rather free hand in the operation of this war? Or is there quite a bit of political direction?

A. This war, like all modern wars, is certainly a mixture of both military and political factors—and, as time goes on, the years pass by, this becomes even more evident and even more important. You can't look at any of these problems in Southeast Asia purely from the military point of view.

Q. When you analyze a problem, do you have a free hand or do civilians tend to override you?

A. We have a very free hand in analyzing a problem, and we try to do it not only from the military point of view, but also from the economic and political viewpoints, too.

We make recommendations to the officials in the Administration as to what our views are. Now, they aren't necessarily always followed, but we have freedom to make known our views—which we do.

Q. From the very beginning in this war, there have been so many optimistic statements that a good many people are saying they just don't believe them any more. Does that criticism bother you?

A. Not particularly. Any estimate that one makes hinges on the background and experience of the individual who makes it, plus his interpretation of what he sees if he actually goes into the country.

I know I sound optimistic to you, and I'm enthusiastic about what I see, because I'm convinced, if we keep on with what we're doing, that we can bring a satisfactory close to this conflict in South Vietnam.

I'm looking at it primarily from a military

point of view, but I'm also keeping firmly in mind the problem of economics, the flow of gold, the cost, the casualties, the meaning of these things to our country—and also the political implications and our relationships with other nations who have an interest or are involved in this, too.

Q. What do you mean by a "satisfactory close" to the war?

A. I mean providing firm security to the people of South Vietnam and getting on with the pacification program.

Q. Once that's done, do you think that it is finished for all time?

A. Well, I wouldn't say it would be finished for all time. I'm just saying that it can be brought to the status to which we want it brought and to which the Vietnamese themselves want it.

## WHEN TROOPS CAN LEAVE

Q. And our troops could then come home?

A. Then our troops could start to come home. As soon as the South Vietnamese people have started on the rehabilitation program—so that their own military forces, their local police and militia are able to protect them from any guerrillas that would be out in the countryside—then I would say that we could start withdrawing our troops.

I think it will be some time, however, before we will be able to do this.

(Mr. RODINO (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. RODINO'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

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[Mr. RODINO'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

## INCOME TAX DEDUCTION FOR TEACHERS

(Mr. CRALEY (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CRALEY. Mr. Speaker, of the many grave problems confronting us today, I know of none more immediate, serious, and of lasting significance than the critical shortage of teachers. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act and Higher Education Act will, like medicare, have the immediate effect of pointing up an already existing shortage; namely, manpower—teachers.

The rationale for supporting those bills and others improving educational opportunity in the United States, is also behind my present support of legislation to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The purpose of this amending legislation I support is to allow teachers to deduct from gross income the expense incurred in pursuing courses for academic credit and degrees at institutions of higher education and certain educational travel expenses.

As of July 7, 1966, the Internal Revenue Service indicated an intention to change



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recorded in volume 65-D, of Births, at page 110.

Given under by Hand and Official Seal of Office at Lancaster, South Carolina, this 23rd day of May, A.D. 1962.

LEE O. MONTGOMERY,  
Clerk of Court for Lancaster County, S.C.  
By \_\_\_\_\_ Deputy Clerk.

## PENN-CENTRAL MERGER

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, I was pleased at today's action by the Interstate Commerce Commission in reaffirming its April 27 decision regarding the Penn-Central merger. The Commission's maintenance of September 30, 1966, as the effective date of the merger is particularly important to the future of the New Haven Railroad. Early consummation of the merger will insure that continuance of the New Haven's vital passenger and commuter services is not jeopardized by delays in the Penn-Central proceeding. Other problems may well lie ahead for the New Haven, but the ICC's action today assures that it will not be the stumbling block to a longrun solution of the New Haven's situation.

Today's decision is also commendable for its assurance that the ICC will consider further the question of indemnification of the Erie-Lackawanna, Delaware & Hudson, and Boston & Maine Railroads by the merging railroads, and that these three carriers will have an opportunity to seek ultimate inclusion within the Penn-Central system. As the Commission itself points out, further proceedings regarding these three carriers will be governed by the "fair and equitable" language of the Interstate Commerce Act. These three railroads provide important transportation services that must not be neglected, and the Commission's assurances regarding their future are a step forward in developing an approach to keeping these services in operation.

I have supported the concept of a merger between the Pennsylvania and New York Central Railroads since the time that I was Attorney General. It has been and is my belief that such a merger is the first step forward in the development of a modern and integrated transportation system in the eastern part of the United States. Such a system must exist if we are to satisfy the growing needs of this region's citizens for swift and efficient service from city to city and from city to suburb. That is why early consummation of the merger, with adequate provision for inclusion of vital service now being provided by other carriers, is so important to the public.

### OTHERS ARE NOW ALSO REVEALING THE TRUTH ABOUT THE UNDECLARED WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, little by little—trickle by trickle—the truth about the U.S. tragic and needless involvement in a large-scale land war in southeast Asia is coming to light.

Over this last weekend, four important statements appeared in the public press showing the growing fears of an ever-

widening group of people concerning the quagmire in which the United States finds itself enmeshed in Vietnam because of its rigidity of position, its failure to face facts, and its consistent adherence to preconceived misconceptions.

Writing in the New York Times magazine for September 18, 1966, under the title "A Middle Way Out of Vietnam," the noted historian and former special assistant to both President Kennedy and President Johnson, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., gave a striking analysis of the course open to the United States to extricate itself from its difficult position in Vietnam. Professor Schlesinger points out:

The illusion that the war in South Vietnam can be decided in North Vietnam is evidently a result of listening too long to our own propaganda. Our Government has insisted so often that the war in Vietnam is a clear-cut case of aggression across frontiers that it has come to believe itself that the war was started in Hanoi and can be stopped there. . . . Yet the best evidence is that the war began as an insurrection within South Vietnam which, as it has gathered momentum, has attracted increasing support and direction from the north. Even today the North Vietnamese regulars in South Vietnam amount to only a fraction of the total enemy force (and to an even smaller fraction of the American army in South Vietnam).

About U.S. attempts at reconstruction, Professor Schlesinger writes:

Much devotion and intelligence are at present going into the programs of reconstruction, but prospects are precarious so long as the enemy can slice through so much of South Vietnam with such apparent immunity; and so long as genuine programs of social reform threaten the vested interests of the Saigon Government and of large landholders.

Professor Schlesinger's assessment of the reconstruction program is underscored by a report appearing in the New York Times this morning from Saigon by Charles Mohr stating:

Top South Vietnamese officials have made varying assessments of the pacification or "revolutionary development" work done so far in 1966. The most optimistic was that performance was "not quite satisfactory," the bluntest that progress was "quite limited" and that "not much was achieved."

Commenting on administration statements that the real enemy in Vietnam is Red China, Professor Schlesinger warns:

The proposition that our real enemy in Vietnam is China is basic to the policy of widening the war. It is the vital element in the Administration case. Yet the proof our leaders have adduced for this proposition has been exceedingly sketchy and almost perfunctory. It has been proof by ideology and proof by analogy. It has not been proof by reasoned argument or by concrete illustration.

As for the middle course for the future, Professor Schlesinger advises:

I think a middle course is still possible if there were the will to pursue it. And this course must begin with a decision to stop widening and Americanizing the war—to limit our forces, actions, goals and rhetoric. Instead of bombing more places, sending in more troops, proclaiming ever more ardently that the fate of civilization will be settled in Vietnam, let us recover our cool and try to see the situation as it is: a horrid civil war in which Communist guerrillas, enthusiasti-

cally aided and now substantially directed from Hanoi, are trying to establish a Communist despotism in South Vietnam, not for the Chinese but for themselves. Let us understand that the ultimate problem here is not military but political. Let us adapt the means we employ to the end we seek.

In the same vein, speaking out against what he said was an idea fostered outside of Vietnam that the conflict there was a "kind of holy war between two powerful political ideologies," U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations stated, as part of his annual report to the United Nations:

The Vietnamese people, in particular, have known no peace for a quarter of a century. Their present plight should be the first, and not the last, consideration of all concerned. Indeed, I remain convinced that the basic problem in Vietnam is not one of ideology but one of national identity and survival. I see nothing but danger in the idea, so assiduously fostered outside Vietnam, that the conflict is a kind of holy war between two powerful political ideologies.

Also, over the weekend, the Vatican announced that Pope Paul VI would urge prayers on a worldwide basis during the month of October as part of a peace campaign to end the war in Vietnam. It is to be hoped that the prayers of the multitudes will include one for those in positions of leadership in the administration to face up to the facts not only as they are but as they were so that our future course of action can be determined in the light of reality rather than fantasy.

Last Saturday, September 17, 1966, another former adviser to both President Kennedy and President Johnson, Richard Goodwin, speaking before the national board of the Americans for Democratic Action here in Washington, also asked that the American people face up to realities with respect to U.S. involvement in Vietnam. With his knowledge of the inner workings of the White House, Mr. Goodwin called attention to the growing credibility gap between the administration and the American people. Speaking to this point he said:

The air is charged with rhetoric. We are buried in statements and speeches about negotiation and peace, the defense of freedom and the dangers of communism, the desire to protect the helpless and compassion for the dying. Much of it is important and sincere and well-meaning. Some is intended to deceive. Some is deliberate lie and distortion. But the important thing is not what we are saying, but what we are doing; not what is being discussed, but what is happening. . . . In this, as in so many aspects of the war, much of the information which feeds judgment is deeply obscured. Of course, in times of armed conflict facts are often elusive and much information, of necessity, cannot be revealed. By its nature war is hostile to truth. Yet with full allowance for necessary uncertainties I believe there has never been such intense and widespread deception and confusion as that which surrounds this war. The continual downpour of contradiction, mis-statements, and kaleidoscopically shifting attitudes has been so torrential that it has almost numbed the capacity to separate truth from conjecture or falsehood.

Calling for a return to the platform of the Democratic Party in 1964, "No wider war," Mr. Goodwin called for the formation of a "national committee against widening of the war." He said:

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I suggest this organization work with other groups and individuals to form a national committee against widening of the war. It will not be aimed at withdrawal or even a lessening of the war in the South, although individuals who oppose escalation may also hold those views. Thus it will be open to all groups who oppose escalation in the North regardless of their position on other issues, and will be open to the millions of Americans who belong to no group but who share this basic belief and apprehension. Such a committee can provide a constant flow of objective information about Vietnam. It can keep vigil over official statements and ask the hard questions which might help separate wishful thinking from facts. It will neither be against the Administration nor for it, neither with any political party or opposed to it, neither liberal nor conservative. Its sole aim will be to mobilize and inform the American people in order to increase the invisible weight of what I believe to be the American majority in the deliberations and inner councils of government. Its purpose is to help the President and others in government by proving a counter pressure against those who urge a more militant course; a pressure for which those in government should be grateful since it will help them pursue the course of wise restraint.

As more and more of the truth is revealed about the reasons for the United States becoming mired in the morass in Vietnam, many more people will join their voices with those who have been speaking out for years against the steady escalation of the U.S. commitment in Vietnam and demand a halt to this senseless escalation of a war we should not be in.

I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at the conclusion of my remarks the article by Mr. Schlesinger referred to from New York Times magazine for September 18, 1966, the article by Mr. Mohr from the New York Times for September 19, 1966, excerpts from the report by Secretary General U. Thant, the article from the New York World Journal Tribune for September 18, 1966, describing the Pope's proposed action, and excerpts from the speech by Richard Goodwin on September 17, 1966, before the Americans for Democratic Action.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times Magazine, Sept. 18, 1966]

SCHLESINGER SUGGESTS THAT WE RECOVER OUR COOL AND FOLLOW A MIDDLE WAY OUT OF VIETNAM

(By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.)

Why we are in Vietnam is today a question of only historical interest. We are there, for better or for worse, and we must deal with the situation that exists. Our national security may not have compelled us to draw a line across Southeast Asia where we did, but, having drawn it, we cannot lightly abandon it. Our stake in South Vietnam may have been self-created, but it has nonetheless become real. Our precipitate withdrawal now would have ominous reverberations throughout Asia. Our commitment of over 300,000 American troops, young men of exceptional skill and gallantry engaged in cruel and difficult warfare, measures the magnitude of our national concern.

We have achieved this entanglement, not after due and deliberate consideration, but through a series of small decisions. It is not only idle but unfair to seek out guilty men. President Eisenhower, after rejecting American military intervention in 1954, set

in motion the policy of support for Saigon which resulted, two Presidents later, in American military intervention in 1965. Each step in the deepening of the American commitment was reasonably regarded at the time as the last that would be necessary; yet, in retrospect, each step led only to the next, until we find ourselves entrapped today in that nightmare of American strategists, a land war in Asia—a war which no President, including President Johnson, desired or intended. The Vietnam story is a tragedy without villains. No thoughtful American can withhold sympathy as President Johnson ponders the gloomy choices which lie ahead.

Yet each President, as he makes his choices, must expect to be accountable for them. Everything in recent weeks—the actions of the Administration, the intimations of actions to come, even a certain harshness in the Presidential rhetoric—suggests that President Johnson has made his choice, and that his choice is the careful enlargement of the war. New experiments in escalation are first denied, then disowned, then discounted and finally undertaken. As past medicine fails, all we can apparently think to do is to increase the dose. In May the Secretary of the Air Force explained why we were not going to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong; at the end of June we began the strikes against the oil depots. The demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam has been used by North Vietnam units for years, but suddenly we have begun to bomb it.

When such steps work no miracle—and it is safe to predict that escalation will be no more decisive in the future than it has been in the past—the demand will arise for “just one more step.” Plenty of room remains for widening the war; the harbors of North Vietnam, the irrigation dikes, the steel plants, the factories, the power grid, the crops, the civilian population, the Chinese border. The fact that we excluded such steps yesterday is, alas, no guarantee that we will not pursue them tomorrow. And if bombing will not bring Ho Chi Minh to his knees or stop his support of the Vietcong in South Vietnam, there is always the last resort of invasion. General Ky has already told us that we must invade North Vietnam to win the war. In his recent press conference, the Secretary of State twice declined to rule out this possibility.

The theory, of course, is that widening the war will shorten it. This theory appears to be based on three convictions: first, that the war will be decided in North Vietnam; second, that the risk of Chinese or Soviet entry is negligible, and third, that military “victory” in some sense is possible. Perhaps these premises are correct, and in another year or two we may all be saluting the wisdom and statesmanship of the American Government. In so inscrutable a situation, no one can be confident about his doubt and disagreement. Nonetheless, to many Americans these propositions constitute a terribly shaky basis for action which has already carried the United States into a ground war in Asia and which may well carry the world to the brink of the third world war.

The illusion that the war in South Vietnam can be decided in North Vietnam is evidently a result of listening too long to our own propaganda. Our Government has insisted so often that the war in Vietnam is a clear-cut case of aggression across frontiers that it has come to believe itself that the war was started in Hanoi and can be stopped there. “The war,” the Secretary of State has solemnly assured us, “is clearly an ‘armed attack,’ cynically and systematically mounted by the Hanoi regime against the people of South Vietnam.”

Yet the best evidence is that the war began as an insurrection within South Vietnam which, as it has gathered momentum, has attracted increasing support and direction

from the north. Even today the North Vietnamese regulars in South Vietnam amount to only a fraction of the total enemy force (and to an even smaller fraction of the American army in South Vietnam). We could follow the genial prescription of General LeMay and bomb North Vietnam back to the Stone Age—and the war would still go on in South Vietnam. To reduce this war to the simplification of a wicked regime molesting its neighbors, and to suppose that it can be ended by punishing the wicked regime, is surely to misconceive not only the political but even the military character of the problem.

As for the assurances that China will not enter, these will be less than totally satisfying to those whose memory stretches back to the Korean War. General MacArthur, another one of those military experts on Oriental psychology, when asked by President Truman on Wake Island in October, 1950, what the chances were of Chinese intervention, replied, “Very little. . . . Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter.” Such reasoning lay behind the decision (the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at that time is Secretary of State today) to send American troops across the 38th Parallel despite warnings from Peking that this would provoke a Chinese response. In a few weeks, China was actively in the war, and, while there was the greatest slaughter, it was not notably of the Chinese.

There seems little question that the Chinese have no great passion to enter the war in Vietnam. They do not want to put their nuclear plants in hazard; and, in any case, their foreign policy has typically been a compound of polemical ferocity and practical prudence. But the leaders in Peking are no doubt just as devoted students of Munich as the American Secretary of State. They are sure that we are out to bury them; they believe that appeasement invites further aggression; and, however deep their reluctance, at some point concern for national survival will make them fight.

When will that point be reached? Probably when they are confronted by a direct threat to their frontier, either through bombing or through an American decision to cross the 17th Parallel and invade North Vietnam. If a Communist regime barely established in Peking could take a decision to intervene against the only atomic power in the world in 1950, why does anyone suppose that a much stronger regime should flinch from that decision in 1966? Indeed, given the present discord in Peking, war may seem the best way to renew revolutionary discipline, stop the brawling and unite the nation.

It is true that the Chinese entry into the Korean War had at least the passive support of the Soviet Union; but it would be risky today to rely on the Sino-Soviet split to save us from everything, including Soviet aid to China in case of war with the United States or even direct Soviet entry into the war in Vietnam. For the Soviet Union is already extensively involved in Vietnam—more so in a sense than the Chinese—and it would be foolish to suppose that, given Moscow's competition with Peking for the leadership of the Communist world, Russia could afford to stand by and allow Communist North Vietnam or Communist China to be destroyed by the American imperialists.

As for the third premise (that military “victory” is in some sense possible): The Joint Chiefs of Staff, of course, by definition argue for military solutions. They are the most fervent apostles of “one more step.” That is their business, and no one should be surprised that generals behave like generals. The fault lies not with those who give this advice but those who take it. Once, early in the Kennedy Administration, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs outlined the



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processes of escalation in Southeast Asia before the National Security Council, concluding, "If we are given the right to use nuclear weapons, we can guarantee victory." President Kennedy sat glumly rubbing an upper molar. After a moment someone said, "Mr. President, perhaps you would have the general explain to us what he means by victory." Kennedy grunted and dismissed the meeting. Later he said, "Since he couldn't think of any further escalation, he would have to promise us victory."

What is the purpose of bombing the north? It is hard to find out. According to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, "The objective of our air campaign is to change the will of the enemy leadership." Secretary McNamara, on the other hand, has said, "We never believed that bombing would destroy North Vietnam's will." Whatever the theory, the results would appear to support Secretary McNamara. The northern strategy instead of driving Hanoi to the conference table, seems to have hardened the will of the regime, convinced it that its life is at stake, brought it closer to China and solidified the people of North Vietnam in its support.

"There is no indication," General Westmoreland said the other day, "that the resolve of the leadership in Hanoi has been reduced." In other words, bombing has had precisely the effect that the analyses of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey after the Second World War would have forecast. Under Secretary of State George Ball was a director of that survey; this may well be why he has been reported so unenthusiastic about the air assault on the North.

And, far from stopping infiltration across the 17th Parallel, bombing, if our own statistics are to be believed, has stimulated it. "It is perfectly clear," Secretary McNamara has said, "that the North Vietnamese have continued to increase their support of the Vietcong despite the increase in our effort. . . . What has happened is that the North Vietnamese have continually increased the amount of resources, men and material that they have been willing to devote to their objective."

Nor can we easily match this infiltration by enlarging our own forces—from 300,000, for example, to 500,000 or 750,000. The ratio of superiority preferred by the Pentagon in guerrilla war is 10 to 1, which means that every time we send in 100,000 more men the enemy has only to send in 10,000 or so, and we are all even again. Reinforcement has not created a margin of American superiority; all it has done is to lift the stalemate to a higher and more explosive level. Indeed, there is reason to suppose that, in its own manner, the enemy can match our every step of escalation up to the point of nuclear war.

U.S. News & World Report says in its issue of Aug. 22: "It's clear now to military men: bombing will not win in Vietnam." This is a dispiriting item. Why had our military leaders not long ago freed themselves from the illusion of the omnipotence of air power, so cherished by civilians who think wars can be won on the cheap? The Korean war, as Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway has said, "taught that it is impossible to interdict the supply route of an Asian army by airpower alone. We had complete air mastery over North Korea, and we clobbered Chinese supply columns unmercifully. . . . But we did not halt their offensive nor materially diminish its strength." If air power was not decisive in Korea, where the warfare was conventional and the terrain relatively open and compact, how could anyone suppose that it would be decisive against guerrillas threading their way through the hills and jungles of Vietnam?

The bombing illusion applies, of course, to South as well as to North Vietnam. Tactical bombing—bombing in direct support of

ground operations—has its place; but the notion that strategic bombing can stop guerrillas runs contrary to experience. And we had it last winter, on the authority of the Secretary of State, that despite the entry of North Vietnamese regulars the war in South Vietnam "continues to be basically a guerrilla operation."

Sir Robert Thompson, who planned the successful British effort against the Malayan guerrillas and later served as head of the British advisory mission in Saigon, has emphasized that the defending force must operate "in the same element" as their adversaries. Counterinsurgency, he writes, "is like trying to deal with a tomcat in an alley. It is no good inserting a large, fierce dog. The dog may not find the tomcat; if he does, the tomcat will escape up a tree; and the dog will then chase the female cats. The answer is to put in a fiercer tomcat."

Alas, we have no fiercer tomcat. The counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam has languished, while our bombers roam over that hapless country, dumping more tonnage of explosives each month than we were dropping per month on all Europe and Africa during the Second World War. Just the other day our bombs killed or injured more than 100 civilians in a hamlet in the Mekong Delta—all on the suspicion that two Vietcong platoons numbering perhaps 60 men, were there. Even if the Vietcong had still been around, which they weren't, would the military gain have outweighed the human and political loss? Charles Mohr writes in *The Times*: "Almost every provincial hospital in Vietnam is crowded with civilian victims of the war. Some American doctors and other officials in the field say the majority are the victims of American air power and South Vietnamese artillery."

The trouble is that we are fighting one war, with our B-52's and our naval guns and our napalm, and the Vietcong are fighting another, with their machine guns and ambushes and forays in the dark. "If we can get the Vietcong to stand up and fight, we will blast him," General Westmoreland has plaintively said; and when they occasionally rise to the surface and try to fight our kind of war, we do blast them. But the fact that they then slide back into the shadows does not mean that we are on the verge of some final military triumph. It means simply that we are driving them underground—where they renew themselves and where our large, fierce dog cannot follow.

Saigon officials have been reporting that Vietcong morale is declining as long as I can remember; these reports need not be taken seriously now. I know of no convincing evidence that the Vietcong lack the political and emotional commitment to keep fighting underground for another 20 years.

Our strategy in Vietnam is rather like trying to weed a garden with a bulldozer. We occasionally dig up some weeds, but we dig up most of the turf, too. The effect of our policy is to pulverize the political and institutional fabric which alone can give a South Vietnamese state that hope of independent survival which is our presumed war aim. Our method, in other words, defeats our goal. Indeed, the most likely beneficiary of the smashed social structure of South Vietnam will be Communism. "My feeling," Gen. Wallace Greene, commandant of the Marine Corps, has wisely said, "is that you could kill every Vietcong and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam and still lose the war. Unless we can make a success of the civic-action program, we are not going to obtain the objectives we have set."

Much devotion and intelligence are at present going into the programs of reconstruction, but prospects are precarious so long as the enemy can slice through so much of South Vietnam with such apparent im-

munity; and so long as genuine programs of social reform threaten the vested interests of the Saigon Government and of large landholders. In any case, as claimants on our resources, these programs of pacification are hopelessly outclassed by the programs of destruction. Surely, the United States, with all its ingenuity, could have figured out a better way to combat guerrilla warfare than the physical obliteration of the nation in which it is taking place. If this is our best idea of "protecting" a country against "wars of national liberation," what other country, seeing the devastation we have wrought in Vietnam, will wish American protection?

At the same time, our concentration on Vietnam is exacting a frightful cost in other areas of national concern. In domestic policy, with Vietnam gulping down a billion and a half dollars a month, everything is grinding to a stop. Lyndon Johnson was on his way to a place in history as a great President for his vision of a Great Society; but the Great Society is now, except for token gestures, dead. The fight for equal opportunity for the Negro, the war against poverty, the struggle to save the cities, the improvement of our schools—all must be starved for the sake of Vietnam. And war brings ugly side-effects: inflation; frustration; angry protest; attack on dissenters on the ground that they cheer the enemy (an attack often mounted by men who led the dissent during the Korean war); premonitions of McCarthyism.

We also pay a cost abroad. Our allies naturally draw away as they see us heading down the road toward war with China. When we began to bomb the oil depots, James Reston wrote: "There is now not a single major nation in the world that supports Mr. Johnson's latest adventure in Hanoi and Haiphong." As nations seek to disengage themselves from the impending conflict, the quasi-neutrality of leaders like de Gaulle gains new plausibility.

On any realistic assessment, Western Europe and Latin America are far more significant to American security than South Asia; yet the Vietnam obsession has stultified our policy and weakened our position in both these vital areas. The war has clouded the hope, once mildly promising, of progress toward a détente with the Soviet Union. It has helped block agreements to end underground nuclear testing and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. It has precipitated the decision of U Thant to resign as Secretary General of the United Nations and condemn the U.N. itself to a time of declining influence.

Our rejection of the views of our friends and allies—our conviction, as Paul H. Smith has put it, "that we alone are qualified to be judge, jury and executioner"—ignores Madison's solemn warning in the 63rd Federalist: "An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the one is that independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind."

The Administration has called the critics of its Vietnam policy "neoisolationists."

But surely the real neoisolationists are those who have isolated the United States from its allies and raised the tattered standard, last flourished 15 years ago by Douglas MacArthur, of "going it alone."

How have we managed to imprison ourselves in this series of dilemmas? One reason surely is that we have somehow lost our understanding of the uses of power. Understanding of power implies above all precision in its application. We have moved away from the subtle strategy of "flexible response" under which the level of American force was graduated to meet the level of enemy threat. The triumph of this discriminate employment of power was, of course, the Cuban missile crisis (where the Joint Chiefs, as usual, urged an air assault on the missile bases). But President Johnson, for all his formidable abilities, has shown no knack for discrimination in his use of power. His technique is to try and overwhelm his adversary—as in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam—by piling on all forms of power without regard to the nature of the threat.

Given this weakness for the indiscriminate use of power, it is easy to see why the application of force in Vietnam has been surrendered to the workings of what an acute observer of the Johnson foreign policy, Philip Geyelin, calls "the escalation machine." This machine is, in effect, the momentum in the decision-making system which keeps enlarging the war "for reasons only marginally related to military need."

The very size and weight of the American military presence generate unceasing pressures to satisfy military demands. These may be demands to try out new weapons; the London Sunday Telegraph recently ran an informative article comparing the Vietnam war to the Spanish Civil War as a military testing ground and laboratory. Or they may be cries for "one more step," springing in part from suppressed rage over the fact that, with military power sufficient to blow up the word, we still cannot compel guerrilla bands in black pajamas to submit to our will. Whatever the reason, Sir Robert Thompson has noted of the American theory of the war: "There was a constant tendency in Vietnam to mount large-scale operations, which had little purpose or prospect of success, merely to indicate that something aggressive was being done."

The administration has freely admitted that such operations, like the bombing of the North, are designed in part to prop up the morale of the Saigon Government. And the impression is growing now that they are also in part undertaken in order to smother doubts about the war in the United States and to reverse anti-Administration tendencies in the polls. Americans have become curiously insensitive to the use of military operations for domestic political purposes. A quarter-century ago President Roosevelt postponed the North African invasion so that it would not take place before the midterm elections of 1942; but today observers in Washington, without evidence of shock, predict a new venture in escalation before the midterm elections of 1966.

The triumph of the escalation machine has been assisted by the faultiness of the information on which our decisions are based. Nothing is phonier than the spurious exactitude of our statistics about the Vietnam war. No doubt a computerized military establishment demands numbers; but the "body count" of dead Vietcong, for example, includes heaven knows how many innocent bystanders and could hardly be more unreliable. The figures on enemy strength are totally baffling, at least to the ordinary citizen relying on the daily newspaper. The Times on Aug. 10 described "the latest intelligence reports" in Saigon as saying that the number of enemy troops in South Viet-

nam had increased 52,000 since Jan. 1 to a total of 282,000. Yet, "according to official figures," the enemy had suffered 31,571 killed in action in this period, and the infiltration estimate ranged from 35,000 as "definite" to 54,000 as "possible."

The only way to reconcile these figures is to conclude that the Vietcong have picked up from 30,000 to 50,000 local recruits in this period. Since this seems unlikely—especially in view of our confidence in the decline of Vietcong morale—a safer guess is to question the wonderful precision of the statistics. Even the rather vital problem of how many North Vietnamese troops are in South Vietnam is swathed in mystery. The Times reported on Aug. 7: "About 40,000 North Vietnamese troops are believed by allied intelligence to be in the South." According to an Associated Press dispatch from Saigon printed in The Christian Science Monitor of Aug. 15: "The South Vietnamese Government says 102,500 North Vietnamese combat troops and support battalions have infiltrated into South Vietnam."

"These figures are far in excess of United States intelligence estimates, which put the maximum number of North Vietnamese in the South at about 54,000."

But General Westmoreland told his Texas press conference on Aug. 14 that the enemy force included "about 110,000 main-force North Vietnamese regular army troops." Perhaps these statements are all reconcilable, but an apparent discrepancy of this magnitude on a question of such importance raises a twinge of doubt.

Nor is our ignorance confined to battle-order statistics. We have always lacked genuine knowledge of and insight into the political and cultural problems of Vietnam, and the more we press all problems into a military framework the worse off we are. The Administration in Washington was systematically misinformed by senior American officials in Saigon in 1962-63 regarding the progress of the war, the popularity of Diem, the effectiveness of the "strategic hamlet" program and other vital matters. It was not that these officials were deliberately deceiving their President; it was that they had deceived themselves first. Ordinary citizens restricted to reading the American press were better informed in 1963 than officials who took top-secret cables seriously.

The fact is that our Government just doesn't know a lot of things it pretends to know. It is not discreditable that it should not know them, for the facts are elusive and the judgments incredibly difficult. But it is surely inexcusable that it should pretend to know things it does not—and that it should pass its own ignorance on to the American people as certitude. And it is even less excusable that it should commit the nation to a policy involving the greatest dangers on a foundation so vague and precarious.

So now we are set on the course of widening the war—even at the cost of multiplying American casualties in Vietnam and deepening American troubles at home and abroad; even at the risk of miring our nation in a hopeless and endless conflict on the mainland of Asia beyond the effective employment of our national power and beyond the range of our primary interests; even at the risk of nuclear war.

Why does the Administration feel that these costs must be paid and these risks run? Hovering behind our policy is a larger idea—the idea that the war in Vietnam is not just a local conflict between Vietnamese but a fateful test of wills between China and the United States.

Our political and rhetorical escalation of the war has been almost as perilous as our military escalation. President Kennedy's effort was to pull Laos out of the context of great-power conflict and reduce the Laotian civil war to rational proportions. As he told

Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961, Laos was just not important enough to entangle two great nations. President Johnson, on the other hand, has systematically inflated the significance of the war in Vietnam. "We have tried to make it clear over and over again," as the Secretary of State has put it, "that although Hanoi is the prime actor in this situation, that it is the policy of Peking that has greatly stimulated Hanoi. . . . It is Ho Chi Minh's war. Maybe it is Mao Tse-tung's war."

"In the forties and fifties," President Johnson has said, "we took our stand in Europe to protect the freedom of those threatened by aggression. Now the center of attention has shifted to another part of the world where aggression is on the march. Our stand must be as firm as ever." Given this view, it is presumably necessary to pay the greatest costs and run the greatest risks—or else invite the greatest defeat.

Given this view, too, there is no reason not to Americanize the war. President Kennedy did not believe that the war in Vietnam could succeed as a war of white men against Asians. It could not be won, he said a few weeks before his death, "unless the people [of South Vietnam] support the effort. . . . We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam." We have now junked this doctrine. Instead, we have enlarged our military presence until it is the only thing that matters in South Vietnam, and we plan now to make it still larger; we have summoned the Saigon leaders, like tribal chieftains on a retainer, to a conference in an American state; we crowd the streets of Saigon with American generals (58 at last count) and visiting stateside dignitaries. In short, we have seized every opportunity to make clear to the world that this is an American war—and, in doing this, we have surely gone far to make the war unwinnable.

The proposition that our real enemy in Vietnam is China is basic to the policy of widening the war. It is the vital element in the Administration case. Yet the proof our leaders have adduced for this proposition has been exceedingly sketchy and almost perfunctory. It has been proof by ideology and proof by analogy. It has not been proof by reasoned argument or by concrete illustration.

The proof by ideology has relied on the syllogism that the Vietcong, North Vietnam and China are all Communist states and therefore must be part of the same conspiracy, and that, since the Vietcong are the weakest of the three, they must therefore be the spearhead of a coordinated Chinese plan of expansion. The Department of State, in spite of what has struck most people as rather evident fragmentation of the Communist world, has hated to abandon the cozy old clichés about a centralized Communist conspiracy aimed at monolithic world revolution.

As late as May 9, 1965, after half a dozen years of public Russo-Chinese quarreling, Thomas C. Mann, then No. 3 man in the department, could talk about "instruments of Sino-Soviet power" and "orders from the Sino-Soviet military bloc." As late as Jan. 28, 1966, the Secretary of State could still run on about "their world revolution," and again, on Feb. 18, about "the Communists" and their "larger design." While the department may have accepted the reality of the Russo-Chinese schism by September, 1966, the predominant tone is still to regard Asian Communism as a homogeneous system of aggression. The premise of our policy has been that the Vietcong equal Hanoi and Hanoi equals Peking.

Obviously, the Vietcong, Hanoi and Peking have interests in common and strong ideological affinities. Obviously, Peking would



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rejoice in a Hanoi-Vietcong victory. But they also have divergent interests and purposes—and the divergencies may prove in the end to be stronger than the affinities. Recent developments in North Korea are instructive. If any country was bound to Peking ties of gratitude, it was North Korea, which was preserved as an independent state by Chinese intervention 15 years ago. If any country today is at the mercy of Peking, it is again North Korea. When North Korea now declares in vigorous language its independence of China, does anyone suppose that North Vietnam, imbued with historic mistrust of China and led by that veteran Russian agent Ho Chi Minh, would have been more slavish in its attitude toward Peking?

The other part of the Administration case has been proof by analogy, especially the good old Munich analogy. "I'm not the village idiot," the Secretary of State recently confided to Stewart Alsop. "I know Hitler was an Austrian and Mao is a Chinese. . . . But what is common between the two situations is the phenomenon of aggression." The Vietnam war, President Johnson recently told the American Legion, "is meant to be the opening salvo in a series of bombardments or, as they are called in Peking, 'wars of liberation.'" If this technique works this week in Vietnam, the Administration suggests, it will be tried next week in Uganda and Peru. But, if it is defeated in Vietnam, the Chinese will know that we will not let it succeed elsewhere.

"What happens in South Vietnam," the President cried at Omaha, "will determine—yes, it will determine—whether ambitious and aggressive nations can use guerrilla warfare to conquer their weaker neighbors." The Secretary of State even described an exhortation made last year by the Chinese Defense Minister, Marshal Lin Biao, as a blueprint for world conquest comparable to Hitler's "Mein Kampf."

One thing is sure about the Vietnam riddle: it will not be solved by bad historical analogies. It seems a trifle forced, for example, to equate a civil war in what was for hundreds of years the entity of Vietnam (Marshal Ky, after all, is a North Vietnamese himself) with Hitler's invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia across old and well-established line of national division; even the village idiot might grasp the difference.

When President Eisenhower invoked the Munich analogy in 1954 in an effort to involve the British in Indochina, Prime Minister Churchill, a pretty close student of Munich in his day, was unmoved. The Chinese have neither the overwhelmingly military power nor the timetable of aggression nor, apparently, the pent-up mania for instant expansion which would justify the Hitler parallel. As for the Lin Biao document, the Rand Corporation, which evidently read it with more care than the State Department bothered to do, concluded that, far from being Mao's "Mein Kampf," it was a message to the Vietcong that they could win "only if they rely primarily on their own resources and their own revolutionary spirit," and that it revealed "the lack, rather than the extent, of Peking's past and present control over Hanoi's actions."

In any case, guerrilla warfare is not a tactic to be mechanically applied by central headquarters to faraway countries. More than any other form of warfare, it is dependent on conditions and opportunities within the countries themselves. Whether there are wars of national liberation in Uganda and Peru will depend, not on what happens in Vietnam, but on what happens in Uganda and Peru.

One can agree that the containment of China will be major problem for the next generation. But this does not mean that we must re-enact in Asia in the sixties the exact drama of Europe in the forties and fifties.

The record thus far suggests that the force most likely to contain Chinese expansionism in Asia (and Africa, too) will be not Western intervention but local nationalism. Sometimes local nationalism may call on Western support—but not always. Countries like Burma and Cambodia preserve their autonomy without American assistance. The Africans have dealt with the Chinese on their own. The two heaviest blows recently suffered by Peking—the destruction of the Communist party in Indonesia and the declaration of independence by North Korea—took place without benefit of American patronage or rhetoric.

In the unpredictable decades ahead, the most effective bulwark against "international" Communism in some circumstances may well be national Communism. A rational policy of containing China could have recognized that a Communist Vietnam under Ho might be a better instrument of containment than a shaky Saigon regime led by right-wing mandarins or air force generals. Had Ho taken over all Vietnam in 1954, he might today be enlisting Soviet support to strengthen his resistance to Chinese pressure—and this situation, however appalling for the people of South Vietnam, would obviously be better for the United States than the one in which we are floundering today. And now, alas, it may be almost too late; the whole thrust of United States policy since 1954, and more than ever since the bombing of the North began, has been not to pry Peking and Hanoi apart but to drive them together.

Is there no way out? Are the only alternatives widening the war or disorderly and humiliating withdrawal? Surely, our statesmanship is not yet this bankrupt. I think a middle course is still possible if there were the will to pursue it. And this course must begin with a decision to stop widening and Americanizing the war—to limit our forces, actions, goals and rhetoric. Instead of bombing more places, sending in more troops, proclaiming ever more ardently that the fate of civilization will be settled in Vietnam, let us recover our cool and try to see the situation as it is: a horrid civil war in which Communist guerrillas, enthusiastically aided and now substantially directed from Hanoi, are trying to establish a Communist despotism in South Vietnam, not for the Chinese but for themselves. Let us understand that the ultimate problem here is not military but political. Let us adapt the means we employ to the end we seek.

Obviously, military action plays an indispensable role in the search for a political solution. Hanoi and the Vietcong will not negotiate so long as they think they can win. Since stalemate is a self-evident precondition to negotiation, we must have enough American armed force in South Vietnam to leave no doubt in the minds of our adversaries that they cannot hope for victory. They must also have no illusion about the prospect of an American withdrawal. The object of the serious opposition to the Johnson policy is to bring about not an American defeat but a negotiated settlement.

Therefore, holding the line in South Vietnam is essential. Surely, we already have enough American troops, firepower and installations in South Vietnam to make it clear that we cannot be beaten unless we choose to scuttle and run, which will not happen. The opponents of this strategy talk as if a holding action would put our forces under siege and relinquish all initiative to the enemy. This need not, of course, be so. It is possible to slow down a war without standing still; and, if our present generals can't figure out how to do this, then let us get generals who can. Generals Ridgway and Gavin could doubtless suggest some names. Moreover, there is a South Vietnamese army

of some 600,000 men which can take all the initiative it wants. And if we are told that the South Vietnamese are unwilling or unable to fight the Vietcong, then we must wonder all the more about the political side of the war.

The object of our military policy, as observers like Henry Kissinger and James MacGregor Burns have proposed, should be the creation and stabilization of secure areas where the South Vietnamese might themselves undertake social and institutional development. Our resources should go, in the Vietnam jargon, more to clear-and-hold than to search-and-destroy (especially when search-and-destroy more often means search-and-drive-underground). We should get rid of those "one-star generals who," in the words of Sir Robert Thompson, "regard their tour in Vietnam as an opportunity to indulge in a year's big-game shooting from their helicopter howdahs at Government expense."

At the same time we should induce the Saigon Government to institute generous amnesty provisions of the kind which worked so well in the Philippines. And we should further increase the incentive to come over by persuading the South Vietnamese to abandon the torture of prisoners—a practice not only horrible in itself but superbly calculated to make the enemy fight to the bitter end. In the meantime we must end our own shameful collaboration with this barbarism and stop turning Vietcong prisoners over to the South Vietnamese when we know that torture is probable.

As for bombing the North, let us taper this off as prudently as we can. Bombing is not likely to deter Hanoi any more in the future than it has in the past; and, given its limited military effect, the Administration's desire to gratify the Saigon Government and the American voter is surely not important enough to justify the risks of indefinite escalation. Moreover, so long as the bombing continues there is no chance of serious negotiation. Nor does the failure of the 37-day pause of last winter to produce a settlement refute this. Thirty-seven days were hardly enough to persuade our allies that we honestly wanted negotiation; so brief an interlude left no time for them to move on to the tricky job of persuading Hanoi. For Hanoi has substantial reasons for mistrusting negotiation—quite apart from Chinese pressure or its own hopes of victory. Ho has entered into negotiation with the West twice in the past—in 1946-47 and again in 1954—and each time, in his view, he lost at the conference table things he thought he had won on the battlefield.

For all our official talk about our readiness to go anywhere, talk to anyone, etc., it cannot be said that the Administration has pursued negotiation with a fraction of the zeal, imagination and perseverance with which it has pursued war. Indeed, some American scholars who have studied the matter believe that on a number of occasions when pressure for negotiation was mounting we have, for whatever reason, stepped up the war.

Nor can it be said that the Administration has laid fairly before the American people the occasional signals, however faint, which have come from Hanoi—as in the early winter of 1965, when U Thant's mediation reached the point of selecting the hotel in Rangoon where the talks might take place, until we killed the idea by beginning the bombing of the North. Nor, for all our declarations about "unconditional" negotiations, have we refrained from setting conditions—such as, for example, that we won't talk to the Vietcong unless they come to the conference table disguised as North Vietnamese. Though the Vietcong constitute the great bulk of the enemy force, they have been given little reason to think we will negotiate about anything except their unconditional surrender.

It is hard to see why we should not follow the precedent of Laos, when we admitted the Pathet Lao to the peace talks, and offer the Vietcong the prospect of a say in the future political life of South Vietnam—conditioned on their laying down their arms, opening up their territories and abiding by the ground rules of free elections. Nor is there reason to see why we have been so reluctant again to follow the Laos model and declare neutralization, under international guarantee, our long-run objective for Vietnam. An imaginative diplomacy would long since have discussed the ways and means of such neutralization with Russia, France, Britain and other interested countries. Unsatisfactory as the situation in Laos may be today, it is still incomparably better than the situation in South Vietnam.

On the other hand, negotiation is not an exclusive, or even primary, American responsibility. Along with a military stalemate, the other precondition of a diplomatic settlement is surely a civilian government in Saigon. Marshal Ky is one of those Frankenstein's monsters we delight in creating in our "client" countries, very much like the egregious General Phoumi Nosavan, who single-handedly blocked a settlement in Laos for two years. Like Phoumi, Ky evidently feels that Washington has committed itself irrevocably to him—and why should he not after the laying on of hands at Honolulu?—and that, whatever he does, we cannot afford to abandon him.

Robert Shaplen, in the August 20 issue of *The New Yorker*, reported from Saigon that the atmosphere there "is being compared to the miasma that surrounded Diem and his tyrannical brother Ngo Dinh Nhu" and that "many Vietnamese believe that the Americans, having embraced Ky so wholeheartedly and supported him so long, are just as responsible as his Government for the recent repressive acts."

I am sure that President Johnson did not intend to turn over American policy and honor in Vietnam to Marshal Ky's gimcrack, bullyboy, get-rich-quick regime. The time is bound to come when Ky must learn the facts of life, as General Phoumi eventually and painfully learned them.

But why wait? In our whole time in Vietnam, there has never been a Government in Saigon which had the active loyalty of the countryside. It might be an agreeable experiment to encourage one to come into existence. Instead of identifying American interests with Ky and rebuffing the broader political impulses in South Vietnam, we should long since have welcomed a movement toward a civilian regime representing the significant political forces of the country and capable both of rallying the army and carrying forward programs of social reform. We should give such a Government all possible assistance in rebuilding and modernizing the political and institutional structures of South Vietnam. And if it should favor the neutralization of its country, if it should seek negotiation with the Vietcong, even if it should release us from our commitment to stay in Vietnam, we should not think that the world is coming to an end.

It is not too late to begin the de-escalation of the war; nor would the reduction of our military effort damage our international influence. "There is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world," George Kennan has written, "by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives." France was stronger than ever after de Gaulle left Algeria, the Soviet Union suffered no lasting damage from pulling its nuclear missiles out of Cuba. And the policy of de-escalation

recommended here it, of course, something a good deal less than withdrawal.

De-escalation *could* work, if there were the will to pursue it. . . . This is the hard question. The Administration, disposed to the indiscriminate use of power, enmeshed in the grinding cogs of the escalation machine, committed to the thesis that China is the enemy in Vietnam, obviously could not turn to de-escalation without considerable inner upheaval. The issue in the United States in the months to come will be whether President Johnson's leadership is sufficiently resilient and forbearing to permit a change in the direction of policy and arrest what is coming increasingly to seem an accelerating drift toward a great and unnecessary catastrophe.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Sept. 19, 1966]

SAIGON TO REFORM RURAL EFFORTS; MARINES BREAK TRAP AT DONGH—PACIFICATION ASSESSED

(By Charles Mohr)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, September 18.—South Vietnamese officials have concluded that there have been serious deficiencies in the rural pacification program this year and that reforms are needed in 1967, highly reliable sources disclosed today.

Top South Vietnamese officials have made varying assessments of the pacification or "revolutionary development" work done so far in 1966. The most optimistic was that performance was "not quite satisfactory," the bluntest that progress was "quite limited" and that "not much was achieved."

In general, the South Vietnamese analyses were more critical and pessimistic than those by United States officials. The Vietnamese studies were not meant for publication but for policy planning.

Veteran observers in Vietnam found the South Vietnamese official pessimism a cause for optimism. Their reasoning was that shortcomings can be overcome only when they are honestly acknowledged.

#### TEAMS IMPLEMENT PROGRAM

Under the rural pacification program, trained teams of workers move into selected rural areas and attempt to bring them firmly under Government control by rooting out the Vietcong apparatus and improving life in the area, as well as through political propaganda.

Although there is a temptation to try, it is impossible to measure the program's progress statistically. The evaluation by the Vietnamese officials shows why.

They concluded, the reliable sources said, that more progress had been made this year than ever before. But in many areas the following faults were discovered:

Pacification planning at the start of the year by provincial officials was "unrealistic." Some teams were shifted from difficult and hostile areas to easy ones to make "better performance scores."

Statistics were unreliable because pacification operations were in some cases "carried out over again many times at the same number of hamlets" that had once been officially declared as pacified.

Physical security was not as good as expected and Vietcong underground agents continued in some cases to collect taxes and carry out propaganda activities.

The quality of pacification workers or "cadres," as they are called, was below expectations. Recruiting met requirements "in quantity but not in quality."

In some cases, team members were "not very enthusiastic toward their work" or toward the people's aspirations. The teams generally stayed in their assigned areas for too short a time and in some cases left and declared them pacified before such judgment was realistic.

#### NUMERICAL REPORT CITED

Those conclusions cast some doubt on the assertion made in a Washington report this week by Robert W. Komer, a special Presidential assistant assigned to the pacification program, that in the first six months of the year 531 hamlets containing 580,000 people had been brought into the pacification program.

The South Vietnamese Government, in planning for 1967, is stressing genuine pacification of hamlets now only "statistically" pacified.

This year each of the 59-man rural pacification teams was supposed to spend a minimum of two to three months in pacifying a hamlet. But in practice, that often was the maximum.

Under a new "rhythm" of pacification planned for 1967, each team is expected to work on no more than two or three hamlets in a year and may spend an entire year in one difficult hamlet.

Each team will be required to leave behind a small number of men to maintain stability. Thus, by 1968 each team will continue to support about two hamlets while undertaking the pacification of two more.

Emphasis will be on well-populated hamlets, on those especially susceptible to economic and agricultural development and those with strategic positions and reasonably good military security.

The new guidelines may lead to more solid achievements but will undoubtedly slow down—at least on paper—the already slow process of pacifying all of South Vietnam's 15,000 hamlets.

Few tasks in public administration anywhere in the world are so complex and difficult as those assigned to the 59-man pacification teams in Vietnam. And, in some cases, they have received poor support from other units and agencies.

The South Vietnamese army, is said to resent the teams as "unmilitary" and has sometimes withdrawn troops without warning, leaving teams exposed to attack by the Vietcong. Teams were sometimes expropriated by provincial officials who used them as regular troops or in guard assignments, leaving their hamlets unshielded.

#### EXCERPTS FROM "INTRODUCTION TO THE ANNUAL REPORT"

(By Secretary General U Thant of the United Nations, Sept. 15, 1966)

#### X. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

This review of the most important developments within the United Nations during the last twelve months has the usual contrasts of light and shadow. The continued slow rate of progress in many of our fields of endeavor, and the setbacks which have been suffered in others, can only be a cause of disappointment to the peoples of the world in whose name the Charter of the United Nations was written. For this, however, they must not blame the Charter itself nor the institutions which it created.

The weaknesses and shortcomings of the United Nations lie not in its constitutional purposes, objectives and procedures but in world conditions at the present juncture of history. The proceedings of the Organization inevitably mirror the state of the relationships between different peoples and different nations and sometimes between the rulers and the ruled; the economic circumstances under which they live; the social conditions that surround them. It is in these realms, and not in the structure(s) of the United Nations, that the roots of the troubles of the world lie.

The troubles arising from present conditions are abundant. They are the prevalence of narrow nationalisms, the periodic reliance on crude power—whether political,



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military or economic—to serve or protect supposed national interests, the appalling rise in the quantity and destructive potential of nuclear armaments, the ever more serious gaps in economic development, the persistence of colonial domination over several million people, the continuing prevalence in many parts of the world of racial discrimination and suppression of human rights, and, among populations constantly increasing, the widespread inadequacies of education, food shortages verging on famine, and lack of medical care. These excesses, inequities and injustices—and the fears, tensions, frustrations, jealousies and aggressions which they breed among peoples and among nations—still too largely condition the state of the world, still too strongly and adversely influence the national policies which Member States bring to bear on the work of the United Nations, and still too seriously obstruct rather than challenge the capacity of the Organization to fulfill its purposes.

In the present difficult state of international affairs, I believe it to be the first duty of the membership to face up to the fact that the chances of fruitful international co-operation on many crucial issues in which the United Nations has a clear responsibility for decision and action—issues ranging from disarmament to development—have been steadily and seriously impaired over the past two years by a situation over which, for well-known reasons, the United Nations has not been able to exercise any effective control. This situation, of course, is the deepening crisis over Viet-Nam, where the dangerous escalation of armed force has been accompanied, in my view, by an increasing intransigence and distrust among Governments and peoples.

For my own part, I have tried by best to help in the efforts which have been made to reduce the escalation of the conflict in Viet-Nam and to move to the conference table the quest for a solution of the problem. In doing so, I have been increasingly distressed to observe that discussions of the matter have by and large been dominated by consideration and analysis of the power politics involved, and that there has been much less concern for the tremendous human suffering which the conflict has entailed for the people of Viet-Nam and also for the people of other countries involved in the fighting. My heart goes out to them. The Viet-Namese people, in particular, have known no peace for a quarter of a century. Their present plight should be the first, and not the last, consideration of all concerned. Indeed, I remain convinced that the basic problem in Viet-Nam is not one of ideology but one of national identity and survival. I see nothing but danger in the idea, so assiduously fostered outside Viet-Nam, that the conflict is a kind of holy war between two powerful political ideologies.

The survival of the people of Viet-Nam must be seen as the real issue, and it can be resolved not by force but by patience and understanding. In the framework of a willingness to live and let live. If this approach can be accepted on all sides—and the moral influence of Governments and peoples outside the immediate conflict can help to bring this about—I believe it should be possible to reach a settlement which would end the suffering in Viet-Nam, satisfy the conscience of the world at large and remove a formidable barrier to international co-operation.

Although Viet-Nam represents the most serious manifestation of the unsatisfactory state of international affairs, it is not the only point of open danger. The situation in the Middle East has shown no improvement, and dangerous tensions persist. I sincerely trust that the hopes newly raised for a settlement in Yemen will be fulfilled. I also hope that the involvement of the United

Nations in the difficult question of Aden may help to bring about a peaceful solution there. Beyond these questions lies the long-standing conflict between Israel and the Arab States and the continuing need for passions to be restrained and the terms of the armistice agreements to be observed by all concerned.

I shall not conceal my distress at some of the happenings in Africa during the last twelve months—not only those which have hardened the colonial and quasi-colonial attitudes still entrenched in large parts of the continent, but also those involving sudden and violent political changes in newly independent States. They have created a sense of instability which can easily be misrepresented or exaggerated to the disadvantage of Africa as a whole and, by causing an increase in tensions among African countries, they have produced a setback to African unity. By no means all of the many problems that the African peoples are facing are of their own making, but few, if any, of them can be solved except by the African countries themselves showing the qualities of maturity and restraint which they have often displayed, and using these qualities to endanger the greater spirit of co-operation and willingness to work together, which is essential to the fulfilment of Africa's destiny. This task is so important that Governments and peoples must put above everything else a willingness to sink their differences in the higher interests of Africa and of the world as a whole.

The situation in Latin America also gives cause for some concern. Notwithstanding the several factors which should enable Latin America to move forward in its economic and social development, the area as a whole is finding it very hard to consolidate satisfactory growth rates. Many of the difficulties encountered are home-made and must be eliminated by the Latin American countries themselves, while others stem from Latin America's economic relations with the rest of the world and their solution must be sought in an effective and continuous policy of international understanding and co-operation.

At the same time, I must make clear my belief that, while we face up to the existence of national and even international situations which are beyond the control of the United Nations and recognize the harmful effects which they may have on the progress of international co-operation within its sphere of activity, the United Nations should be enabled to act more effectively and decisively than it has done so far on many of the matters before it. We cannot wait for the world to right itself—for the great Powers, in particular, to adjust their differences—before applying greater determination and, if necessary, a larger sacrifice of time-honoured attitudes to the solution of urgent problems.

It has, of course, been partly because of the deterioration in the international situation that it has not been possible to make greater progress in regard to such basic issues as disarmament. The world disarmament conference still remains a somewhat distant goal. The problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has gained added urgency and there is a greatly increased need for early action on account of the terrible prospect of more countries joining the "nuclear club". It is also, in my view, both necessary and feasible to agree upon a ban of all nuclear tests. I hope that the discussions at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly will demonstrate, above all to the nuclear Powers themselves, how essential it is to make speedy progress in regard to these matters.

Moreover, the international situations to which I have referred, the rise of tensions and the emergence of new dangers in so many

parts of the world, point to the need for a stronger rather than a weaker United Nations, and one which can be relied upon to undertake peace-keeping operations wherever such action could help in the restoration of stable conditions. Unfortunately, although there seems to be a measure of agreement that these operations have been effective in the past and could prove useful in the future, we are still far from agreement on basic principles. I very much hope that, in the months to come, the general membership and in particular those Members who have a special responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, may find it possible, within the Charter, to agree upon the procedures to be followed in launching such operations, the responsibility of the various organs in their actual conduct, and the financial arrangements by which the expenditures involved may be met. I must draw attention to the fact that the peace-keeping activities of the United Nations, perhaps more than any other part of its work, have enabled the Organization to gain a measure of public confidence which is in danger of being lost if the Member States remain deadlocked on the constitutional and financial questions involved.

I should like to add, in this connexion, that I believe that regional organizations will have an important role to play in future in reducing tensions within their regions and in promoting co-operative efforts to attain common ends. The work of the United Nations at the regional level in the economic and social fields has won universal acclaim; the original economic commissions have become increasingly effective in helping the developing countries not merely through research and studies but also by direct operational activities including those which have led to the establishment of economic and social planning institutes and development banks. The work of inter-governmental regional bodies outside the United Nations can also, I am sure, contribute to the solution of problems between countries within a region. However, there are certain questions of jurisdiction and competence which arise with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, especially in the peace-keeping field, and concerning which the role of the regional organizations requires clearer definition. Some time ago, I suggested that a study of the functioning of regional organizations in terms of their respective charters might be useful, and I mention it again in the belief that Governments should wish to follow it up.

It is as important for a stronger United Nations to continue the long-term task of building the peace as it is to equip itself for helping countries to keep the peace. It is not enough, in my opinion, for the United Nations to deal where it can, and as the case arises, with each specific problem that threatens world peace. The causes of tension in the world have to be attacked at all of their many roots. We have the means of doing so, and we have made a start. While for example, the international activities in the fields of economic and social development and human rights do not figure in the headlines, the fact is that the greater part of the resources of the United Nations and its family of agencies is devoted to these tasks. The manner in which they are undertaken has a direct relationship to the reduction of tensions. I have said many times that it is essential that the gulf between the rich and the poor countries should be narrowed. I attach the greatest importance to the Governments of Member States taking seriously the goals of the United Nations Development Decade, and making deliberate progress towards the achievement of these goals.

There are other causes of tension which cannot be left to resolve themselves. In par-

ticular, I feel that the United Nations must make a sustained attack on the problems which we might, because of their origin or their nature, describe as the problems of colonialism. While recognizing that substantial progress has been made, we cannot afford to forget that the process of decolonization has not been completed. A hard core of actual colonialism still exists, particularly in Africa. It is coupled with the kindred problem of racial discrimination, and this evil in turn subjects the majority of the population of one of the largest independent States in Africa to conditions akin to the worst type of colonial subjection. I believe that in these situations there lies a great opportunity for statesmanship on the part of the colonial Powers—an opportunity which they must seize before it is too late.

It is impossible, moreover, to view some of these outstanding problems—whether it is the position of the United Nations in regard to the crisis in South-East Asia or the lack of progress in disarmament—without relating them to the fact that the United Nations has not yet attained the goal of universality of membership. In the long run the Organization cannot be expected to function to full effect if one fourth of the human race is not allowed to participate in its deliberations. I know that there are serious political difficulties involved in correcting this situation; but I hope that the long-term advantages may be more clearly seen and the necessary adjustments made.

This process may take some further time. Meanwhile, I feel that all countries should be encouraged and enabled, if they wish to do so, to follow the work of the Organization more closely. It could only be of benefit to them and to the United Nations as a whole to enable them to maintain observers at Headquarters, at the United Nations Office at Geneva and in the regional economic commissions, and to expose them to the impact of the work of the Organization and to the currents and cross-currents of opinion that prevail within it, as well as to give them some opportunity to contribute to that exchange. Such contacts and inter-communication would surely lead to a better understanding of the problems of the world and a more realistic approach to their solution. In this matter I have felt myself obliged to follow the established tradition by which only certain governments have been enabled to maintain observers. I commend this question for further examination by the General Assembly so that the Secretary-General may be given a clear directive as to the policy to be followed in the future in the light, I would hope, of these observations.

The United Nations is an experiment in multilateral international diplomacy. Governments maintain here Permanent Representatives who have to carry out instructions understandably designed to promote the political and other interests of the Governments concerned. At the same time, however, these Governments have subscribed to the principles and ideals of the Charter and they have to recognize that one of its basic purposes is to be "a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations" in the attainment of the common ends for which the United Nations was established. I am glad that in most cases the representatives of Member States do not, in their pursuit of national interests, forget the larger interests of humanity represented by this Organization. I personally believe that it should be possible for the Governments of Member States in all cases to use the United Nations as a centre for harmonizing their actions so that the interests of humanity may not suffer but may be properly served.

In these observations I have stressed some of the basic beliefs which I have held in the discharge of my functions as Secretary-General over the last fifty-eight months.

I feel that this is an appropriate occasion for me to urge that the problems to which I have referred and the suggestions which I have made deserve careful consideration if the Organization is to be strengthened, if peace is to be preserved and promoted, and if we are to make real progress towards the goal of the economic and social advancement of all peoples. There are many ways of reaching these objectives of peace and well-being, and I do not believe that anyone should adopt a dogmatic approach to them. Conditions differ widely from country to country and each has the right, within the broad framework of the principles of the United Nations, to pursue its goals in its own way and by means which it judges most appropriate and fruitful. At the same time I believe that the ideological differences that have divided the world are beginning to show signs of losing their sharp edge, and I approach the end of my term of office with some confidence that, over the years, the United Nations will prove to be the means by which mankind will be able not only to survive, but also to achieve a great human synthesis.

[From the New York (N.Y.) World Journal Tribune, Sept. 18, 1966]

#### PAPAL PLEA FOR PEACE

VATICAN CITY.—Pope Paul VI will urge worldwide prayers in October as part of a new peace campaign to try to end the war in Viet Nam, the Vatican announced yesterday.

The Vatican said the Pope will issue an encyclical letter to the world's bishops Monday urging special prayers next month—the month of the Holy Rosary.

An authoritative source said world peace would be foremost among the subjects recommended for prayer and that the pontiff had given Viet Nam much serious thought during the two months he spent at his summer residence in Castel Gandolfo. He returned to the Vatican yesterday afternoon.

The source said the Pope felt this was the time for a new peace campaign, but his action is expected to be chiefly religious in nature rather than a specific suggestion to statesmen or a sensational gesture.

The Pope, who has been in Castel Gandolfo since July 16, returned to the Vatican yesterday afternoon. Some sources speculated he might start his push for peace in an informal speech from his window overlooking St. Peter's Square today.

"There has been a spate of rumors that something big is coming up," the source said, "but it would appear that a mediation offer or a peace-making trip to one of the countries concerned is out of the question for the time being. A call for worldwide prayer would seem more likely."

"If the Pope has some specific suggestion to make, beyond those he made in the past, he might do so later in a public speech or through diplomatic channels. But an appeal for prayers seems certain to be the first step."

#### APOSTOLIC LETTER

The call could take the form of an apostolic letter to the world's bishops or a message asking all Catholics to pray for world peace during October, the "month of the Holy Rosary."

The sources said the Viet Nam war and other threatening developments such as the great purge in Red China were one of the Pope's main concerns during his two-month stay in Castel Gandolfo.

Another was the question of possible changes in the church's ban on artificial birth control, on which a papal pronouncement may be forthcoming before the end of the year.

Pope Paul scored one victory by bringing about a short-lived Christmas truce in Viet Nam last winter.

In recent months, the Pope put aside his

public pronouncements on Viet Nam to concentrate on such other problems as the famine in India. But Vatican sources said he was still quietly exploring all chances to end the southeast Asian war and was ready to act "whenever it appears a gesture on his part could prove helpful."

EXCERPTS FROM SPEECH BY RICHARD GOODWIN BEFORE AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, SEPTEMBER 17, 1966, WASHINGTON, D.C.

There is, however, another issue which has reduced discussions about domestic America to academic discourse, which has swallowed up the New Frontier and Great Society, and which is eroding our position throughout the world. That issue is, of course, the war in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese war is, I believe, the most dangerous conflict since the end of World War II; more dangerous than Berlin or even Korea. In those confrontations the danger was clear and sensibly appraised. The stakes were fairly obvious to both sides. Objectives were carefully limited; and power ultimately became the handmaiden of reason and final accommodation. In Vietnam, on the other hand, the dangers are confused and unclear. Objectives are expressed in vague generalities which open to endless vistas. Moreover, from other cold war confrontations there evolved a set of tacit understandings designed to limit conflict even while it was being waged. That, for example, is the real meaning of the no-sanctuary policy carefully observed, we should remember, by both sides. Today those understandings are in grave danger of being swept away, and with them our most important protections against enlarging conflict.

The air is charged with rhetoric. We are buried in statements and speeches about negotiation and peace, the defense of freedom and the dangers of communism, the desire to protect the helpless and compassion for the dying. Much of it is important and sincere and well-meaning. Some is intended to deceive. Some of it is deliberate lie and distortion. But the important thing is not what we are saying, but what we are doing; not what is being discussed, but what is happening.

And what is happening is not confusing or unclear or contradictory at all. It is not masked in obscurity or buried in secret archives. It stands in clear, vivid and towering relief against the landscape of conflict. The war is getting larger. Every month there are more men in combat, more bombs falling, greater expenditures, deeper commitments. It is the steady inexorable course of this conflict since its beginning. We have gone to the United Nations' and the war has grown larger. We have offered funds for development and talked of social reform; and the war has grown larger. We have predicted victory and called for compromise; and the war has grown larger.

There is therefore, little escape from the conclusion that it will grow larger still.

Nor is this steady pattern the consequence of inexorable historical forces. It flows from the decisions of particular men in particular places—in Washington and Hanoi, in Saigon and in the jungle headquarters of the Vietcong. It is in part a product of communist hope and drive for victory; but it is partly our decision too. And we must suppose those same decisions will continue to be made.

Nor is this, as we are sometimes told, because there is no alternative. There are dozens of alternatives. There are enclave programs, and programs to hold the centers of population. There are suggestions that we rely on pacification of the countryside rather than the destruction of the Vietcong. There are proposals to limit the bombing or to end it. There are proposals for negotiations, complete with all the specifics of pos-

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sible agreement. The fact is the air is full of alternatives. They have simply been rejected in favor of another course; the present course. And we must also suppose they will continue to be rejected.

All prophecy is an exercise in probability. With that caution let us try to strip the argument of its necessary passion and discuss the probabilities which are compelled by the awesome logic of the course of events in Vietnam. Passion is important; it lies at the root of war and of hatred of war. Nor do I lack personal feeling; for only the strongest of feelings could impel me to discuss a subject with which I was so recently connected in so intimate a way. Yet we can perhaps now meet more productively on the common ground of reason. Rarely has there been greater need for such unity among men of good will.

In other places I have set forth my personal views on the conduct of the war in South Vietnam: The belief that we have an important stake in Southeast Asia, and that we must continue the battle in the South—although differently than we are now doing—until a political settlement is reached. And I have, like many others, discussed alternative routes to these objectives. Today, however, I would like to talk about the lengthening shadow of the war in the North; for in that war are the swiftly germinating seeds of the most grave danger.

In this, as in so many aspects of the war, much of the information which feeds judgment is deeply obscured. Of course, in times of armed conflict facts are often elusive and much information, of necessity, cannot be revealed. By its nature war is hostile to truth. Yet with full allowance for necessary uncertainties I believe there has never been such intense and widespread deception and confusion as that which surrounds this war. The continual downpour of contradictions, mistatements, and kaleidoscopically shifting attitudes has been so torrential that it has almost numbed the capacity to separate truth from conjecture or falsehood.

At one time we are told there is no military solution, and then that victory can be ours.

There are months when we talk about negotiations and months when we forget them.

There are times when dissenters give aid and comfort to the enemy and times when they are acting in the greatest of our traditions.

We have been reassured about efforts to reach a peaceful settlement when there is no plan or program for settlement in existence.

We are given endless statistics with a numerical precision which only masks the fact they are based on inadequate information, or guesses, or even wishful thinking. For example, if we take the numbers of enemy we are supposed to be killing, add to that the defectors, along with a number of wounded much less than our own ratio of wounded to killed, we find we are wiping out virtually the entire North Vietnamese force every year. This truly makes their continued resistance one of the marvels of the world. Unless the figures are wrong, which of course they are.

We are told the bombing is terribly costly to North Vietnam. Yet the increase in Soviet and Chinese aid, since the bombing, is far greater, in economic terms, than the loss through bombing. Except in human life, the North Vietnamese are showing a profit.

At the time of the Hanoi-Haliphong bombings last June we were told that in the first six months of 1966 enemy truck movement had doubled, the infiltration of supplies was up 150%, and infiltrated personnel increased 120%. However, the fact is we do not know, except in the most vague and general way, how much supplies are being brought in or how many men. They move at night, sometimes on trails we have not yet discovered, and the best intelligence gives only the most

vague picture. We could not only be wrong, but enormously wrong. The swiftness with which we change our estimates helps show that seeming exactness conceals large uncertainties.

The statements which followed the Hanoi-Haliphong bombings are an illuminating example of this process in action.

It was said the raids would destroy a large proportion of North Vietnam's fuel capacity and this would help paralyze—or at least slow down—the process of infiltration. Yet these raids had been anticipated, alternative techniques of providing fuel had been developed, and the raids were destined to have little if any effect on the North Vietnamese capacity to make war. And this was clear at the time we bombed.

We were told, in an inside story in the New York Times, that the bombings would prove to Hanoi it could not count on its allies. The fact is that aid was stepped up as we anticipated it would be.

Within a few days a high official said fresh intelligence showed that Hanoi was now plunged in gloom, weary of war, and suffused with a sense of hopelessness, presumably at least in part as a result of the raids. Yet, there was no substantial intelligence of this kind. We have heard little about it since. And recent information indicates that the opposite was the case—the enemy's will was strengthened.

The truth is that this major and spectacular escalation in the war had had little measurable effect on the enemy's capacity or morale, and most of those who looked at the matter seriously in advance of the bombing knew it would probably be ineffective.

Yet despite confusion and misstatement, despite the enormous difficulty of grasping the realities on which policy must be based, I believe we can know that further escalation of the war in the North will only bring us farther from settlement and closer to serious danger of a huge and devastating conflict.

We began the campaign of bombing in the North as a result of the enormous and unresolved difficulties of winning the real war, the war in the South.

As predicted by almost every disengaged expert, from General Ridgway to George Kennan; and as taught by the whole history of aerial warfare, that bombing has neither brought the enemy to his knees or to the council table. It has not destroyed his capacity to make war, or seriously slowed down either infiltration or the flow of supplies. At each step it was claimed the bombing would make a decisive difference. Yet it has made hardly any difference at all. In fact, the tempo of conflict has increased.

The official statements justifying the Hanoi-Haliphong raids bore partial witness to the futility of bombing. We were told the raids were necessary because infiltration had increased enormously; and official admission of the failure of one of the most intensive bombing campaigns in world history. Despite thousands upon thousands of raids more men and supplies are flowing South and the routes of infiltration have been widened and improved. Despite the bombing, or perhaps because of it, all signs indicate the North Vietnamese will to fight has stiffened and the possibilities of negotiation have dimmed. Despite the bombing, or because of it, North Vietnam has become increasingly dependent upon Russia and China. Despite the bombing, or because of it there has been a vastly increased supply of aid to North Vietnam by Russia and China and a deepening world communist commitment to this war.

In short the bombing has been a failure, and may turn out to be a disaster.

Yet we once again hear voices calling for further escalation; just as each previous time that the bombing has failed we have been told that more bombing is necessary and new goals are articulated. First it was

said we wanted to stop infiltration. Next, we would persuade the North Vietnamese to come to the Council table. Then we would punish them and force them to surrender. Now men are talking of the need to destroy their capacity to make war. And so we move inexorably up the ladder of failure toward widening devastation. And the latest goal, the destruction of enemy capacity, if ever adopted, will be the most vaguely ambitious of all. For such capacity rests on the entire society; and that whole society; factories, dams, power plants, cities themselves must be brought tumbling down.

All of this is possible despite the fact that each future escalation will probably have the effect of previous escalations. It will increase the dangers of wider war, lessen the chances of a negotiated settlement, drain away effort which should be concentrated in the South, and further alienate our allies, and have little damaging effect on the enemy's ability or will to fight.

We are sometimes asked what else we can do. I believe there are other things to do. The war can be fought more effectively in the South. The search for a settlement can be given greater direction and brilliance. We can prepare ourselves, if necessary, to accept a long ground war of attrition leading ultimately to a political settlement. But that is not the question. If the bombing cannot win the war, if it does not work; and above all if it carries tremendous political and military risks, then it should not be increased, either out of frustration with the war or with the polls.

For the greatest danger of this course—the course of escalation—is not only in the extent of devastation and death, or the damage it does to the hope of peaceful solution, but the fact that each step of the way increases in vast proportion the danger of a huge and bloody conflict. If North Vietnam is devastated then all reason for restraint or compromise is gone. The fight is no longer a way for the South but a struggle for survival calling their still largely uncommitted armies and people into battle. Nor can China stand by and see its ally destroyed. I do not believe China wants to fight the United States, at least not yet; but it cannot stand by while we destroy North Vietnam. To do so would forfeit all its claim to moral and political leadership of militant communism. They would then be truly a paper dragon, stoking the fires of revolution only when Chinese blood and land was not at stake.

Nor is China's entrance likely to be signalled by a huge and dramatic sweep of armies across the frontier. It is far more likely that increasing destruction in the North will stimulate or compel the Chinese to accelerate the nature and kind of their assistance. Perhaps Chinese pilots will begin to fly air defense over Hanoi. The number of Chinese troops in North Vietnam may be greatly increased. Chinese anti-aircraft crews may be placed throughout the country. Thus, step by step, China acting in response to seeming necessities, may become involved in a war it did not fully contemplate, much as we have. And there are many signs that this process has already begun. This is the most likely and grave route to enlarging conflict. And if China does enter we must bomb them, for certainly we will not permit them sanctuaries or, if it comes to that, engage their armies solely in the jungles of Southeast Asia. And lastly is the Soviet Union, forced to choose between China and America.

None of this is certain. An entirely different course is possible. Yet the danger of such a chain of events grows by immeasurable strides each time we enlarge the war in the North; and if past is prologue we will continue that enlargement. Yet the fantastic fact, the truth that challenges belief, is that this is being done although virtually no one remains beside some of the engaged



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military and a few men in the State Department—virtually no one in the Administration or out—who believes that increased bombing will have a decisive effect on the war in South Vietnam. We are taking likely and mounting risks in pursuit of an elusive, obscure, marginal, and chimerical hope; a course which defies reason and experience alike.

Yet I believe this is the way we are going: that only beneficent and uncertain fortune can bar the way. This is not a belief born of personal fear. After all, we, or most of us, will continue to work and prosper, hold meetings and make speeches, unless all of our civilization is swallowed up. Even then enough will survive for the race to evolve and perhaps create something finer. It is rather a belief born of a fallible reason and analysis, always better able to describe our situation than guide our action, which seeks in the acts of our past and the attitudes of our present a guide for our future.

I do not wish however, to come with a counsel of despair. The surest guarantee of misfortune is resignation. Therefore, we must all make what effort we can. There are enormous differences among the critics of the war. There are those who believe we have no interest in Vietnam or even in all of Asia. There are those who wish us to withdraw. There are fierce debates over the history of the war, the nature of its participants, the goals of our enemies. There are those, like myself, who believe we should carry on the war in the South while intensifying, modifying and sharpening the search for peaceful compromise tied to some measures of de-escalation in the North. Yet our danger is so grave that those who fear the future even more than they distrust the past—a group which encompasses, I believe, the majority of the American people—must seek some common ground rather than dissipating energies in exploring the varieties of dissent. Without sacrificing individual views we must also shape a unified stand, a focal point of belief and action which can unite all who apprehend coming dangers. Only in this way can we create a voice strong enough to be heard across the country, bringing together men of diverse beliefs, adding strength to the views of those in government who share this apprehension. It must also be a clear and direct stand; one that fires response in those millions of our fellow citizens who glimpse through complexity, discord and obscurity the vision of something dark and dangerous.

I believe there is such a position. It is simply the victorious slogan of the Democratic Party in 1964. It is: No wider war. It is to oppose any expansion of the bombing. It is to speak and work against all who would enlarge the war in the North.

Such a stand will not end the war in South Vietnam. It may even prolong it. It will not fully answer the deep objections, feelings and fears of many in this room or across the country. But it can crystallize the inarticulate objections of many. It may well increase the weight and impact of the forces of restraint. Most importantly it strikes at the most ominous menace to the lives of millions and the peace of the world. Such a rallying cry requires compromise, the willingness to seek less than is desired; but that is the basic necessity of those who seek not self indulgence but to shape the course of this nation.

To be most effective this position will require more than speeches and resolutions. It will need structure and purpose. I suggest this organization work with other groups and individuals to form a national committee against widening of the war. It will not be aimed at withdrawal or even a lessening of the war in the South; although individuals who oppose escalation may also hold those views. Thus it will be open to all groups who oppose escalation in the

North regardless of their position on other issues, and will be open to the millions of Americans who belong to no group but who share this basic belief and apprehension. Such a committee can provide a constant flow of objective information about Vietnam. It can keep vigil over official statements and ask the hard questions which might help separate wishful thinking from facts. It will neither be against the Administration nor for it, neither with any political party or opposed to it, neither liberal nor conservative. Its sole aim will be to mobilize and inform the American people in order to increase the invisible weight of what I believe to be the American majority in the deliberations and inner councils of government. Its purpose is to help the President and others in government by providing a counter pressure against those who urge a more militant course; a pressure for which those in government should be grateful since it will help them pursue the course of wise restraint.

Although I believe deeply in this proposal I do not wish to give the argument a certainty I do not have. The most important fact of all, the unknown which transcends all debate, are the thoughts and intentions of our adversaries and their allies. Yet skepticism born of imperfect knowledge cannot be permitted to dull the passion with which we pursue convictions or the fervor of our dissent. For we must fight against fulfillment of Yeats' prophecy which foresaw destruction if the time should come when "the best lack all conviction, and the worst are full of passionate intensity."

Some have called upon us to mute or stifle dissent in the name of patriotism and the national interest. It is an argument which monstrously misconceives the nature and process and the greatest strength of American democracy. It denies the germinal assumption of our freedom: that each individual not only can but must judge the wisdom of his leaders. (How marvelously that principle has strengthened this country—never more drastically than in the post-war period when others have buried contending views under the ordained wisdom of the state, thus allowing received error to breed weakness and even defeat. The examples are legion. The virgin lands settlement and the Great Leap Forward failed because experiment was made into unchallengeable law; while we began to catch up in space, modernized and increased our defenses, and started the Alliance for Progress because what began as dissent became national purpose). Of course the enemy is glad to see our divisions. But our concern is with America not Hanoi. Our concern is with those millions of our own people, and with future generations, who will themselves be glad to see that there were men who struggled to prevent needless devastation and thus added to the strength and the glory of the United States.

Among the greatest names in our history were men who did not hesitate to assault the acts and policies of government when they felt the good of the nation was at stake: Jefferson at a time when the integrity of the new nation was still in doubt, Lincoln during the Mexican war, Roosevelt in the midst of national depression, John F. Kennedy among cold war defeats and danger.

Only a dozen years ago, in 1954, another American leader assaulted our policy in Vietnam, saying "The United States is in clear danger of being left naked and alone in a hostile world . . . It is apparent only that American foreign policy has never in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal. What is American policy in Indochina? All of us have listened to the dismal themes of reversal and confusions and alarms and excursions which have emerged from Washington . . . We have been caught bluffing our enemies. Our friends and allies are

frightened and wondering, as we do, where we are headed . . . The picture of our country needlessly weakened in the world today is so painful that we should turn our eyes from abroad and look homewards."

It is in this same spirit of concern for our country that we should conduct our dissent as, on that day, did Lyndon B. Johnson then leader of the minority party.

It is not our privilege, but our duty as patriots, to write, to speak, to organize, to oppose any President and any party and any policy at any time which we believe threatens the grandeur of this nation and the well-being of its people. This is such a time. And in so doing we will fulfill the most solemn duty of free men in a free country: to fight to the limit of legal sanction and the most spacious possibilities of our constitutional freedoms for the safety and greatness of their country as they believe it to be.

The arguments of this speech have been practical ones founded, to the limits of my capacity and knowledge, upon the concrete and specific realities and dangers of our present situation. But there is more than that in the liberal faith. American liberalism has many faces. It pursues divergent paths to varied and sometimes conflicting goals. It cannot be captured in an epigram or summarized in a simple statement of belief. Part of it, however, is simply and naively a belief in belief. It is the idealistic, visionary and impractical faith that action and policy and politics must rest on the ancient and rooted values of the American people. It still believes that for a nation to be great, to serve its own people and to command the respect and trust of others, it must not only do something but stand for something. It must represent in speech and act in ideals of its society and civilization.

Some part of the conflict in Vietnam may have been unavoidable, some is the result of well-intentioned error, but some must surely flow from the fact we have bent belief to the demands of those who call themselves realists or tough minded.

It is not realistic or hard-headed to solve problems and invest money and use power unguided by ultimate aims and values. It is thoughtless folly. For it ignores the realities of human faith and passion and desire; forces ultimately more powerful than all the calculations of economists and generals. Our strength is in our spirit and our faith. If we neglect this we may empty our treasuries, assemble our armies and pour forth the wonders of our science, but we will act in vain and we will build for others.

It is easy to be tough when toughness means coercing the weak or rewarding the strong; and when men of power and influence stand ready to applaud. It is far harder to hold to principle, speaking, if necessary, alone against the multitude, allowing others to make their own mistakes, enduring the frustration of long and inconclusive struggles, and standing firm for ideals even when they bring danger. But it is the true path of courage. It is the only path of wisdom. And it is the sure path of effective service to the United States of America.

## CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

## MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the

## The Future Looks Bright in South Vietnam

### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 19, 1966

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, one of the most optimistic reports on the recent election in Vietnam comes from William S. White.

I commend to the attention of our colleagues Mr. White's column which appeared in the September 16, 1966, edition of the New York World Journal Tribune. The column follows:

VIET FUTURE LOOKS BRIGHT  
(By William S. White)

WASHINGTON.—The long nightmare of Viet Nam is lifting at last, and though the way to final victory over the Communist assailants from without and within still stretches out long and forbidding, a true pre-dawn does now loom faintly ahead.

This is the real meaning of the spectacular success for the people of South Viet Nam. In the teeth of tireless terrorism from the Communists, they have voted in better than 80 per cent of their total strength in a free election.

They are going now to make a democratic constitution by orderly and democratic means. To all the world they have issued, moreover, a thundering rebuke to all those—the Communists, the fellow-travelers, the merely deluded peaceniks and beatniks—who for years have peddled the monstrous fiction that the Communist Viet Cong were in truth popular in South Viet Nam and were only engaged in a "democratic revolution."

By immense majorities, the South Vietnamese themselves have forever destroyed this Big Lie version of current history. By immense majorities, they have shown their determination both to keep their country from the reaching grasp of internal and external Communist trigger men and to make of it a decent state in Asia.

This is a victory for American policy of measureless importance—not for Democratic policy and not for Republican policy but for a partisan stance of strength in travail and of steadfast honor in piled-up adversity. To this splendid end the Republicans, and notably the party's leading figures in and out of Congress, have contributed with memorable generosity and magnificent concern for the vital, non-political interests of this nation and of all the free world.

In the narrower sense, of course, it is a triumph for the Democratic President who has risked most in Viet Nam and has borne the heaviest of the burden from a constantly biting Democratic New Left at home and the incessantly destructive carping that has come from some of our alleged friends, such as Charles de Gaulle of France.

Will it all help Democratic Congressional candidates in November's elections? No doubt it will assist most of them, since most have stood all along with this nation's pledge to stay the course in Viet Nam. No doubt, too, it may improve the President's "Image" in the opinion polls.

But it will also help many a Republican congressional candidate, as well it should, for many of these, too, have supported with unshaken courage the commitment of three successive Presidents of the United States to the people of South Viet Nam.

To look for two-bit domestic partisan credit or gain in this transcendental victory

for a tortured people and for an old concept called the right to freedom—to freedom even in Asia—would be little-minded beyond belief. For what has happened in Viet Nam can scarcely be described without the use of superlative heaped upon superlative.

For the first time in the Cold War a nation under Communist attack not only from abroad but at home has been able to conduct a free election as free men. The so-called war of liberation as a special instrument of Communist China lies in ruins in the now-deserted balloting places of South Viet Nam for the cynical and evil fraud it has always been.

The Red Chinese have been thrown back as never before. The policy of a rationally restrained but absolutely determined military resistance to Chinese aggression-by-proxy has been proved beyond all doubt to be not only one of honor but one of effectiveness as well.

Over Asia the long darkness is lifting at least, though not yet dispersed. The Chinese wave of the future is not, after all, to be the wave of the future for Asia, just as Hitler's wave of the future broke at length two decades ago upon the great rock of resolute Allied resistance.

## Great Lakes Water Pollution Conference

### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. RAY J. MADDEN**

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 19, 1966

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, on last Friday I spoke to the delegates from eight States bordering on the Great Lakes and also representatives from our neighbor Canada.

I am hereby submitting excerpts from remarks which I made to the assembled delegates:

EXCERPTS FROM SPEECH OF CONGRESSMAN RAY J. MADDEN BEFORE CONFERENCE OF GREAT LAKES WATER POLLUTION AT THE PALMER HOUSE, CHICAGO, ILL., SEPTEMBER 16, 1966

Mr. Chairman: Vice President HUMPHREY and his cosponsors are to be commended for calling this conference to further develop and decide upon executive action to curtail and eventually eliminate the pollution of Lake Michigan and the other great bodies of water commonly called the "Great Lakes" of our Nation.

This conference representing officials from the States of New York, Illinois, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Minnesota, Indiana, Michigan and Canada are contributing a great deal of their time and services in coming to Chicago on this occasion to help solve one of the Nation's greatest problems—Water Pollution.

This conference will also consider the pollution problems of the Great Lakes and also the pollution problems pertaining to inland lakes, rivers, and streams located within the borders of the above-mentioned states.

In the last session of Congress I joined with a great number of other House and Senate Members in sponsoring resolutions to establish the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration and to provide grants for research and development, to increase grants for the construction of municipal sewage treatment plants, to authorize the establishment of standards of water quality to aid in preventing, controlling and abating pollution of interstate waters, and for other purposes.

"In short, most that was lovely has been made hideous and riches have been squandered. It is a late chapter in the sad history of so many North Shore harbors."

There are still a piddling 40 acres of productive wetlands left in Mt. Sinai Harbor. Dr. Murphy and others trying to save the last remains of a rich natural asset are fighting now to save those last 40 acres from the dredge.

Brookhaven Town wants to enlarge the harbor, dredging the area for commercial sand and gravel—with the spoil materials to be dumped on Cedar Beach—and also to dig a 200-foot wide channel to a boat yard on the landward end of the harbor.

The U.S. Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service in recent years was given authority to speak up on conservation questions like the dredging permit.

Summarized, their answer to the town says:

The dredger mining gravel in the harbor now has "operated outside the area covered by the permit and excavated to a depth exceeding that authorized."

A February 1965 report, the federal service pointed out, "stated that dredging and filling in Mount Sinai Harbor has already caused incalculable loss," that "this often-extended permit (for gravel mining) was responsible for a large part of these losses."

And the report sums up, "sacrifice of an additional 40 acres of salt marsh and salt water wetlands does not seem warranted by the need for additional anchorage for boats, inasmuch as a very deep harbor has already been created accompanied by the destruction of over 100 acres of irreplaceable estuarine habitat."

The report is buttressed by facts garnered in on-the-spot investigations which showed that silt from dredging was causing damage and that more wetland was sliding into deep potholes gouged by the dredge.

The federal expert's findings urge that the gravel dredging permit be denied. They also urge that the boat channel dredging request be denied.

Instead, the experts say, a 100-foot wide channel to the boat yard, no more than six feet deep, should be created largely by using a longer path of existing natural channels.

Those findings will be part of the testimony next Oct. 7 when the Army Corp of Engineers holds a unique hearing—only the second on Long Island in recent years—on whether or not to grant permission for the dredging.

The unusual 10 a.m. session at Port Jefferson High School was set up because a valiant handful of conservationists, like Dr. Murphy, demanded a chance to be heard publicly.

They are still working wetlands in Mt. Sinai Harbor that produce food for fish, fish for the water and shore birds that frequent the harbor, fish for the bigger fish at sea—fish for man.

There are blue crabs in the wetlands too, and the other marine life sustained by the miraculous wetlands cycle.

There is gravel there, too.

If the past repeats itself, some day there will be no gravel left in once-beautiful Mt. Sinai Harbor.

Long before that, if heedless man has his way, there will be no trace of the wetlands superfarm.

The waters will be as barren of life as a desert.

Just remember this. Man can make a desert bloom.

He can not bring wetlands back to life once they have been destroyed.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Victor and the Long Island Press have exposed the problems. It is our responsibility in the Congress to find the solutions.

I also participated in sponsoring legislation on clearing up water pollution along the shores of the great water bodies referred to as the "Great Lakes."

The legislation sponsored by our colleagues, Congressman JOHN A. BLATNIK, of Minnesota, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Public Works, and Senator EDMUND S. MUSKIE of Maine, have made great progress in Congress.

The House legislation would provide \$2.45 billion for sewage treatment plants for the next five years and establish a new concept of incentive grants amounting to 10 percent for the development of basin plans for water pollution control. It would also increase the Federal grant by another 10 percent or up to 50 percent under the basin plan, if the States matched to the extent of 25 percent of the total costs. It would also provide \$228 million for water pollution research through the next three years as well as other progressive steps toward curbing water pollution.

The work that has been done in this session of Congress is merely a beginning of future plans to make an all-out effort to solve the water pollution problem. If not curbed, polluted water will, in a few years, jeopardize the health of millions of human beings as well as animal and plant life throughout our land. Economists estimate that in this generation we have suffered losses from water and air pollution that run into billions of dollars each year. Unless this program is pursued to a successful conclusion, the future cost to the American people in health, epidemics, and destruction of animal and plant life will be incalculable.

If this corruption and poison of our lakes and streams, our lands, our rivers and forests and the atmosphere itself is not eliminated the progress and future expansion of food production, health and agriculture itself will be curtailed. Pollution of our water resources affects every human being and form of life throughout the land. It has been reported by experts who have studied pollution that every river, stream and lake within our nation's borders has, in some degree, suffered from pollution. Pollution in our Great Lakes system and in our inland lakes and rivers has already destroyed millions of wild life, fish and other game.

Our nation, states, and local communities much organize and develop committees of experts to formulate long range plans to achieve cooperation with our national government and work out a unified and nationwide solution to clear up the waters of our country. Communities along with industry and business must be willing and able to contribute funds necessary for constructing and installing modern facilities to destroy industrial waste and sewage before it is released to enter our streams and lakes. Sewage and industrial waste, under modern scientific inventions, can be satisfactorily cured and eradicated before it enters the streams and lakes. The installation of the necessary machinery on the part of industry and municipalities can curb this nationwide poisonous health hazard and it must be done regardless of the cost.

The people of our nation are cognizant of the fact that Federal financial assistance will be necessary if this great program is to succeed. It is also necessary that every municipality, business and industry cooperate in this necessary effort. President Johnson has recommended, and I am satisfied the vast majority of Members of Congress are in favor of an all-out effort to master this problem but we must have the complete cooperation of local industry and municipalities to succeed in the effort. Federal grants for waste treatment plants now total more than \$725 million. Almost 7,000 projects are now under construction or already completed. The president also requests an additional \$150

million to continue this important and necessary effort.

The Federal Government already possesses authority to immediately bring suit to stop pollution when the pollution constitutes an imminent danger to public health or welfare. Our Government has the right to subpoena witnesses in administrative hearings and the Secretary has the right to initiate enforcement proceedings when pollution occurs in navigable waters, intrastate or interstate. The Government also has authority to demand registration of all existing or potential sources of major pollution and the United States officials have the right to inspect such sources. Private citizens also are allowed to bring suit in Federal Court to seek relief from pollution. These may seem strict and stringent measures nevertheless extraordinary steps must be taken to preserve health and human life as well as animal and vegetable production in our Nation.

The Federal Government has already taken effective steps requiring all new Federal installations to include adequate water pollution control systems. All Federal agencies are required to submit long-range plans to bring existing installations up to a high level of pollution control required by the new facilities.

If the destruction of our fresh water supply in certain sections of the United States continues it will be but a short time until the shortage of water will be the number one problem facing approximately 200 million people in our land. President Johnson is doing everything in his power and the Congress will cooperate in legislation and participating funds to expand methods to conserve existing water supplies and prevent complete destruction of our lakes, rivers and streams.

**Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Corbin, Director of  
Air Force Legislative Liaison, To Be  
Transferred**

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

**HON. CHARLES S. GUBSER**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 19, 1966

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, I have heard it said that if you want to know a man do business with him. But if you want to understand him take a trip with him.

Mr. Speaker, some weeks ago it was necessary for us to say goodbye, with reluctance, to a man, Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Corbin, Director of Air Force Legislative Liaison, whom many of us are privileged to know and understand.

Of course, we were pleased that he was to be transferred to a new and more challenging position, but nevertheless we shall miss a good friend.

All of us who did business with General Corbin learned to respect him for the splendid service he rendered our constituents through us. His office was operated fairly and efficiently, with the best interests of the Nation as well as the Air Force in mind at all times. I found my constituents' problems considered with compassion and with a thoroughness that was all and more than any of us should expect. Doing business with General Corbin was a great source of satisfaction.

But I was to enjoy a special privilege—that of taking a trip with General Corbin and learning to know and understand him as a friend. In the fall of 1965, the Special Investigating Subcommittee of Armed Services, on which I serve, visited every major military supply center in an extensive 5-week trip around the world. Those of us who traveled with General Corbin appreciated his diligence in seeing to it that the information we needed in our work was available to us. Whether it was talking to a GI in the combat zones of Vietnam, pursuing a serious point in a top-secret hearing or briefing, fulfilling the important social requirements at official receptions and dinners in foreign lands, or expertly handling the controls of a fast jet while landing on some Asian airfield, all of us who had the privilege of traveling with Gen. Thomas Corbin remember him for what he is, truly a man's man, a great friend, a fine officer, and a gentleman.

#### Dedication of the Chapel of Our Lady of Siluva in Washington, D.C.

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

**HON. EDWARD A. GARMATZ**

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 19, 1966

Mr. GARMATZ. Mr. Speaker, Sunday, September 4, marked a very important day in the lives of all Lithuanians in this country, and those of Lithuanian descent. On that day, in the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception here in Washington, was dedicated the Chapel of Our Lady of Siluva.

This solemn occasion marked the culmination of much time, effort and sacrifice on the part of Americans of Lithuanian descent and therefore was a time of great rejoicing for all. They came from many parts of the country to join in the celebration.

There are a number of Lithuanians living in my district in Baltimore and we were all highly honored to have one of the most prominent of them, the Right Reverend Louis J. Mendelis, pastor of St. Alphonsus Church in downtown Baltimore, chosen to deliver the address on that happy occasion. Knowing that it will be of great interest to all of you, I am inserting it in the Appendix of the RECORD.

SILUVA CHAPEL DEDICATION SERMON, THE NATIONAL SHRINE, WASHINGTON, D.C., SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1966

"This is the work of the Lord: It is marvelous in our eyes! This is the day which the Lord has made! Let us rejoice and be glad in it." Ps. 117: 23-24.

On this historic occasion, no words can express more fittingly the sentiments of deep gratitude that fills the hearts of ALL Lithuanians everywhere, then the words of the psalmist just cited. The Siluva Chapel we dedicate today is the work of the Lord and it is marvelous in our eyes. For I recall only too well with what fear and trepidation this work was undertaken by His Excellency Bishop Vincent Brizgys and his Volunteer



**Vietnamese Election Victory May Be Bigger Than We Think****EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF****HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 19, 1966

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, while every friend of freedom is pleased by the results of the South Vietnamese election there are many problems yet to be solved.

Some of the subsidiary benefits of the recent election, however, will help in solving these problems. In this connection I commend to the attention of our colleagues the following column by Joseph Alsop which appeared in the September 16, 1966, edition of the New York World Journal Tribune:

**VIET ELECTION VICTORY MAY BE BIGGER THAN WE THINK**

(By Joseph Alsop)

NHATRANG, VIETNAM.—The chances are that the success of the Vietnamese election is being underrated at home. Any success here falsifies the predictions and flouts the present prejudice of too many people at home, and in Vietnam, too. So any success, however solid, tends to be denigrated by those same people.

Hence the first thing to note is that last Sunday's election was brilliantly, even startlingly, successful. The turnout of voters, so far surpassing the normal American percentage, was far greater than anyone could have forecast.

Furthermore, all those who voted did so in the face of the grimmest warnings by the Viet Cong. Voting was made a heinous crime by the communist pre-election propaganda. This should be noted by the opponents of the President's policy at home, who have a way of hinting that the majority of Vietnamese secretly support the so-called National Liberation Front. The election instead proves that the Viet Cong are exactly what they appear—a small armed minority, seeking to seize control by naked force of a people who want no part of them.

Having said so much (and it is ludicrous that such things should still need saying!) the obvious question is "What next?"

Here in Nhattrang, the headquarters of the Second Corps area, the question seems particularly pressing.

In this corps area, the war is a stage or two ahead of the rest of Viet Nam. The enemy's most important units have been driven to base themselves across the border in Cambodia, whence they merely raid into Vietnamese territory. Except for the four regiments in Cambodia, all the Communist outfits in the field here are suffering gravely from short rations and even worse from malaria. All are trying to avoid combat when possible, and more than one of the larger formations seems to have broken down into separate companies and even platoons.

What you can see ahead, in fact, is a new military phase, in which the threat of the V. C. main forces will be much diminished. But in this next phase, it will still be necessary to do the long and tedious job of tracking down the remaining V. C., squad by squad and platoon by platoon, and concurrently, long before all fighting ends, South Vietnam will have to develop politically.

That would be difficult in any case. In the Vietnamese case, it will be extra difficult for two main reasons that are little understood at home. The first is the doubly colonial character of Vietnamese history. The Vietnamese emerge into history as an occupied and subject people. It took them close to a thousand years to throw off the

Chinese yoke. And even their culture was so colonial that they always carried on the whole business of their quite independent government not in Vietnamese but in Chinese.

Such was the position when the French arrived, to add a second layer of colonial experience. It can be seen, then, that the Vietnamese past provides few raw materials to aid the Vietnamese in evolving modern methods of stable self-government.

With the election of the Constituent Assembly, the Vietnamese have now begun this great task. But already, their second handicap stares them in the face. Any stable governmental system always somehow represents or takes account of the main forces in the community. Yet the army is by all odds the biggest force in Viet Nam at the moment; and there is a general desire to get away from military government.

What will be developed in the end, none can foresee. One may guess that several attempts may have to be made, over a considerable period, before the Vietnamese find what really suits them at last. Before they find this, moreover, Americans should brace themselves for the kind of recurrent political turmoils here that so greatly upset many people at home.

It will hardly avert turmoil, but a great plus in the political equation must also be noted. In brief, besides great industry, courage and intelligence, the South Vietnamese also possess one of the very richest countries in the whole of Asia. Strange as it may seem, moreover, South Viet Nam has actually been enriched by the war, both materially by the construction of a powerful modern infrastructure for the economy, and managerially by the training of hundreds of thousands of technical cadres.

Even in the next phase of "political war," as Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky calls it, there should be at least enough peace to make Vietnamese natural wealth and recent enforced progress count for a very great deal. Economics may therefore lubricate politics. But patience will still be needed, not least by the Vietnamese themselves, until the day finally comes when they have found their own way, as the Koreans have already done.

**Today's Coed Is a Concerned Woman****EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF****HON. GEORGE P. MILLER**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 26, 1966

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Speaker, a very interesting article by Judith Martin, Washington Post staff writer, appeared in that newspaper on Saturday, September 17. Mrs. Martin reported on an interview that she had with Dr. C. Easton Rothwell, president of Mills College, Oakland, Calif.

Dr. Rothwell is one of the foremost members of the academic community. He is a progressive educator in the sense that he keeps abreast of today's developments but is in no way a "faddist." Dr. Rothwell is extremely proud of Mills' graduates and they in turn are extremely proud of him.

The article follows:

**TODAY'S COED IS A CONCERNED WOMAN**

(By Judith Martin)

The college girl has stopped asking herself, "Can I combine marriage and a career?" Instead, what she will need to know is, "Where can I find a good baby sitter?"

In the last two or three years, young women have accepted their own dual interest in families and careers, said C. Easton Rothwell, president of Mills College. They have also become more creative, intellectually richer, less interested in security and more concerned with social ills, he said.

"This is an exciting time," he said. "There's a new liveliness—in classes, in seminars, in bull sessions. You can see it in book withdrawals from the library—books which aren't required for courses—and in the sale of good paperbacks.

"There's a sense of commitment. Security now is considered akin to dullness. The kids are concerned.

"There's a trend to creativity. Partitions are coming down. Mills is one of the real centers for new combinations of the arts, but it's elsewhere, too."

Dr. Rothwell attributes part of the change to the fact that current undergraduates received their early schooling in "the post-Sputnik time and there has been a revolution in education in those years."

Partly, he said, it's a reaction from post-war years, when GIs who were heads of families, conscious of having lost school years and anxious to make them up, influenced campus life.

But partly, he said, it's just because "it's in the air."

The college girl is more likely now, than a few years ago, to be interested in science and do graduate work, he said.

There is less pressure on her to get married young but she's more likely to continue her work after marriage.

Dr. Rothwell, who is on one of "three teams going to 40 cities" to raise money for Mills College, addressed the Mills College alumnae dinner at Fort Myers Officers Club last night.

Each team consists of an administrator, a faculty member and a student. Accompanying him were Barbara Wells, who teaches political science at Mills, and Elizabeth Riddleberger, a student from Charlottesville.

The college is trying to raise money to meet a Ford Foundation grant of \$2,200,000 at a ratio of three to one. A three-year goal of \$10 million is apparently going to be exceeded, and there is a ten-year goal of \$23,500,000.

"But you can't just talk about money," Dr. Rothwell said, so he has been discussing college trends and Mills programs with the alumnae.

The development of interdepartmental courses, such as "Human Development" taught by a biologist, a psychologist and a sociologist and "Patterns of Contemporary American Thought" taught by an art historian, professor of literature and an historian, have been a Mills trend. The juxtaposition of different arts, such as acting to the music of an orchestra, is also being done.

Summer seminars for alumnae and their husbands, a program which has been done before at Mills, will be rescheduled.

**The Nation Is Grateful****EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF****HON. ROBERT L. F. SIKES**

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 22, 1966

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, I note in the September 17 issue of the Journal of the Armed Forces, a very fine editorial from the pen of Louis Stockstill on the presentation to the Honorable Carl Vinson of the Sylvanus Thayer Award. This is one of the Nation's most coveted

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awards and it is highly appropriate that it now be presented to one of the greatest of all Congressmen.

I am very pleased to join my colleagues in extending warmest congratulations to Carl Vinson on being the recipient of this award and I am pleased to submit Mr. Stockstill's commendable editorial for reprinting in the RECORD:

THE NATION IS GRATEFUL  
(By Louis Stockstill)

On Saturday, 10 September, at the United States Military Academy at West Point, a man who is beloved by the Armed Forces received the Sylvanus Thayer Award.

The medal, awarded by the Academy's Association of Graduates, previously has been presented to only eight others, including Generals of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur. This was the first occasion on which the Award has gone to a legislator.

In selecting former Representative Vinson of Georgia for this great honor, the Association could have made no better choice. Carl Vinson's contributions to his nation, to the cause of national security, to the growth and development of the individual Armed Forces and to the men and women who wear their country's uniform will never be surpassed. And they must never be forgotten.

Yet to forget is all too easy. Even when a man actively holds high office he frequently is surrounded by supplicants whose attitude is "We know what you did for us yesterday, but what are you doing today?" When he steps into retirement he can be certain that many of these same people will scarcely remember he ever existed.

Fortunately, the Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy, and others have not permitted Carl Vinson to dwell in the obscurity of retirement. They constantly remind him that the nation is grateful for his long and distinguished service and proud of his achievements.

As he addressed the Cadet Corps, in accepting the Thayer Award, Chairman Vinson observed that the true test of any man is to be able to combine humility with pride, to be wisely aggressive without being dogmatic, to be firm without being stubborn, to be capable of making decisions without being rash, to accept criticism without resenting it, to be compassionate without being weak, to inspire others and at the same time be inspired by others, to be loyal not only to those whom he serves but to those who serve under him.

In his long years of service, the former Congressman met all of these tests.

There are numerous places where Chairman Vinson's accomplishments are memorialized. He has been accorded many honors, including the coveted Presidential Freedom Medal.

But as he returned to his home after the West Point ceremonies, the veteran legislator, who will be 83 on 18 November, could only have found new pride in the knowledge that his name is now forever engraved in the halls of one of the nation's most historic institutions, particularly an institution so close to the people to whom he dedicated a lifetime of labor and love.

### Von Steuben Day, 1966

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN J. ROONEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 19, 1966

Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, last Saturday was a particularly happy day for Americans of German

ancestry as they celebrated the anniversary of the birthday of Friedrich von Steuben. I suppose all of us learned in school that it was Von Steuben who drilled the American Army at Valley Forge, but he was much more than that for he instilled into our ragtag Army a sense of devotion, pride, and loyalty that it cherishes to this day. It is hard to say what would have emerged from Valley Forge after that brutal winter had not Von Steuben provided the discipline that eventually meant victory. It is hard, too, to imagine what would have been the fate of the Revolution without the services of the many thousands of German volunteers. We think often of the great migrations of the middle 19th century and somehow equate all Americans of German ancestry with that time. Nothing could be further from the facts.

In 1766 Benjamin Franklin estimated that Pennsylvania was more than one-third German. In 1776 a census revealed that there were more than 150,000 Americans of German origin or descent. Von Steuben was not the only German name on the roles of valor in the Revolution. He shared those lists with others such as Peter Muhlenberg and Nicholas Herkimer just to mention two. German-Americans have been in the van of every concerted effort of this country be it pushing back the western frontier or settling the bloody Civil War.

It is estimated today that one American in six can trace all or part of his ancestry to Germany. The largest of the German migrations came immediately after the Civil War and in the 20 years following that war more than 2 million of them came to America. Their lot, like that of all immigrants, was not an easy one. In addition to the normal problems and suspicions they had to overcome, they had to learn a new language. But learn it they did and in short order the German immigrant community became a strong bulwark of America. Their influence was tremendous—John Roebling built the Brooklyn Bridge and in doing so invented wire rope.

Stories about that magnificent edifice were printed with type from machines invented by Otto Mergenthaler. George Westinghouse invented the airbrake and made hundreds of contributions to the field of electronics as did Charles P. Steinmetz. Studebaker and Chrysler are well-known names now but not too long ago they were just two more German immigrants.

R. H. Macy, the famous department store, was founded by a peddler named Lazarus Straus who had joined the ranks of his fellow peddlers—Guggenheim, Bloomingdale, and Seligman. It is even reported that Carl Schurz, a German-born Senator from Missouri, friend of President Lincoln, and staunch advocate of Negro and Indian rights, was one of the founders of a political party—the name of which escapes me right now.

The contributions of Americans of German ancestry are too many to even begin to list in these pages. And the list grows as our country continues to prosper. Mr. Speaker, our country owes much to its citizens of German descent and lineage. It is fitting then that we salute them on the occasion of the remembrance of Friedrich von Steuben.

### Mrs. Irene Palmer Challenges Economic Opportunity Programs

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 30, 1966

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the U.S. News & World Report for August 22, carried excerpts from a letter written by a Mrs. Irene Palmer of De Quincy, La., to the Beaumont Enterprise in which she challenged the need for our present economic opportunity programs, war on poverty, and so forth.

For those in this body who might have missed this article, I wish to include it herewith:

#### A DOWN-TO-EARTH LOOK AT A GROWING PROBLEM

(NOTE.—A plain-spoken woman has written a letter to the editor that is attracting widespread attention.)

(In this letter Mrs. Irene Palmer of De Quincy, La., challenges the theory—often stated by top officials—that hardships and poor living conditions explain riots, crime, and growing dependence on government doles. To Mrs. Palmer, this is nonsense.)

(Crippled, forced to leave school at 17, Mrs. Palmer has worked hard, without luxuries, but: "You will never see us in a marching demonstration line wanting something for nothing. We're too proud for that.")

(Following are excerpts from a letter to The Beaumont (Tex.) Enterprise from Mrs. Irene Palmer of De Quincy, La., and published in The Enterprise on Aug. 3, 1966.)

These marches, demonstrations, riotings, looting, police slayings and the such makes me literally sick, especially the reasons our Government officials are trying to cram down our throats as causes of these law-breaking episodes.

Sir, I know what hard work, hardship, pain and suffering is. I had polio at age 5 months which left my left leg one and one-half inches shorter than my right and about one-third the size.

My father died at 6 p.m. Sunday in 1935, was buried Monday on my seventeenth birthday. My mother died at 5 a.m. Tuesday and was buried Wednesday, leaving me with two small sisters and my mother to support.

At 17 I was not a drop-out in school. With no education—not enough, anyway—no experience and with only one good leg, I quit school and went to work to support a family. I didn't have a teen-age life because my working hours were always from 10 to 20 hours a day. In 1948, I got my right hand—my working hand; I'm right-handed—in an electric ice shaver and mangled it. It was doubtful whether I'd ever be able to use it again, but after much pain and suffering I learned to use what I had left of a hand. This left me with one good leg and one good hand, but I didn't give up.

#### FOLLOW ME JUST ONE DAY

I would like for Earl Warren, President Johnson, H. H. HUMPHREY, Martin Luther King, and all the hell-raising juveniles to come to my home and follow me just one day. I can guarantee that they wouldn't have enough pep left to go on a demonstration, marching or rock-throwing party.

My day begins at 4 a.m. and ends about 8 or 9 p.m., when my health permits. I do my own housework, cooking, washing, ironing, sewing, raising flowers and a garden. In fact, for the past three weeks I have been standing in a hot kitchen, over a hot stove, canning my vegetables. Have an air conditioner? Are you kidding? Neither do I run up town